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IMPRUDENT POWER: RECONSIDERING U.S.
REGULATION OF FOREIGN TENDER
OFFERS

Jill E. Fisch *
l.

INTRODUCTION

As the business world becomes increasingly global, capital markets
have become international in scope. 1 The number of cross-border trans
actions, in which Americans invest overseas2 and foreigners purchase
stock in domestic corporations, 3 has grown rapidly. With this develop
ment comes conflict, however, as cross-border transactions implicate the
regulations and interests of more than one sovereign.
Traditionally the United States has viewed its jurisdiction expan
sively and imposed its regulations on transactions that may be viewed as
essentially foreign. 4 This approach has proven costly. The United States
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1 9 82, Cornell University; J.D.
1985, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Lea Brilmayer, Victor Brudney, Mike Martin, Steve The!,
and Bill Treanor for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this Article and to Gary Leibowitz
for his excellent research assistance.
I For current statistical illustrations of the internationalization of the world's capital markets,
as well as a summary of the factors responsible for hastening this development, see Manning G.
Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European Communi
ties, 3 1 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 1 85-93 (!990). See also Stephen H. Axilrod, What Globalization
Means for Emerging Market Issues, 20 F UTURES: THE MAGAZINE OF COMMODITIES & OPTIONS 14
(May 1991) (discussing market, political, and technological factors contributing to the globalization
of securities and capital markets); Arthur R. Pinto, The Internationalization of the Hostile Takeover
Market: Its Implications for Choice-of-law in Corporate and Securities Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
5 5, 62-64 (1990) (describing benefits to American firms and investors resulting from internationaliza
tion of capital markets).
2 For example, in 1990, U.S. investors purchased an estimated $ 1 30.9 billion in foreign equities.
International Tender and Exchange Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29,275, [1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 84,803, at 8 1 ,743 (June 5, 1991) [hereinafter "Tender Offer
Release"].
3 Estimates indicate that cross-border equity investments by Americans, British, Japanese, and
West Germans alone reached a record $92.3 billion in 1989 and that total cross-border stock trading
might approach $5 trillion by the year 2000. See, e.g. , Robert B. Reich, More Purposeful Debt Could
Kick-Start the U.S., JAPAN EcoN. J., Dec. I, 1990, at 9; Worldwide Securities Organization Agrees to
Take Action to Promote Globalization of Securities Markets, PR Newswire, Apr. 10, 1 990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File.
4 See DIETER LANGE & GARY BoRN, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE EXTRATERRITO
RIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL L AWS 4-32 ( 1 987) (listing industries in which internationalization
has led to conflicting regulation by different countries and describing efforts by United States and
other countries to apply their laws extraterritorially in these areas); Warren Pengilley, Extraterrito-

523

N O R T HW E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I EW

has offended the sovereignty of other countries which have reacted by
passing retaliatory legislation of their own. 5 More importantly, the ap
plication of U.S. law to essentially foreign business transactions increases
the cost and uncertainty associated with these transactions and may ulti
mately hurt the American investors who are the intended beneficiaries of
that law.
The harms of the traditional approach have been particularly evi
dent in the regulation of international or cross-border tender offers.
Courts have used expansive notions of jurisdiction to apply the federal
securities laws to transactions with minimal U.S. contacts. 6 The schol
arly commentary has focused exclusively on the jurisdictional issue of
whether the courts are exceeding their power and encroaching on the
interests of other sovereigns. 7 This literature has ignored the fact that
the practice threatens American participation in foreign markets and, in
order to escape U.S. regulation, foreign bidders have denied U.S. inves
tors access to their offers, barring them from participation in economi
cally beneficial transactions. The courts' application of U.S. law to
foreign tender offers has actually injured U.S. investors rather than pro
tected them. Furthermore, the courts' approach does not adequately ad
dress the foreign policy concerns implicated by this expansive application
of U.S. law. Although the Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC")
has partially acknowledged the problems that arise when courts apply
U.S. law to foreign tender offers, its approach does not prevent the courts
from continuing to regulate foreign transactions based on their own con
cepts of foreign policy. 8
This Article will reconsider the issue of U.S. power to regulate for
eign tender offers. The Article will demonstrate a fundamental weakness
in both the existing judicial tests and scholarly commentary: the domes
tic regulation of foreign tender offers should not be addressed as an issue
of subject matter jurisdiction but of choice-of-law. 9 By focusing on the
rial Effects of United States Commercial and Antitrust Litigation: A View from "Down Under", 1 6
V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L . 8 3 3 ( 1 983) (describing various attempts b y United States a t extraterrito
rial application of its commercial Jaw and resulting hostile reactions by the international
community).
5 See infra notes 254-57.
6 See infra Part III.B (discussing "effects test" and "conduct test").
7 For a sample of the scholarly commentary addressing the extraterritorial application of fed
eral securities laws, see Neal T. Buethe & Thomas J. Coyne, Securities Law-Subject Matter Juris
diction in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: The Expanding Application of the Conduct Test, 59
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 47 1 , 472 n.9 ( 1 9 84) (citing commentary); Margaret V. Sachs, The Interna
tional Reach of R ule JOb-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677,
682-83 n.23 (I 990) (same). See also Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1 3 10, 1 3 1 4- 1 6 ( 1 985); Gregory K. Matson, Note,
Restricting the Jurisdiction of A merican Courts over Transnational Securities Fraud, 79 GEO. L.J.
1 4 1 , 148-49 (1 990).
8 See infra Part III.A (discussing SEC proposals).
9 See infra Part IV.A.
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courts' power to apply U.S. law, courts and commentators have been di
verted from considering the propriety of regulation. An analysis in terms
of choice-of-law presents the issue primarily in terms of policy, not
power.
The Article will then describe the policy inquiries that the courts, in
their focus on subject matter jurisdiction, have failed to consider and will
demonstrate why courts are ill-suited to perform such a policy-oriented
analysis. Moreover, the Article will demonstrate that the courts have
failed to achieve the investor protection goals at the heart of the federal
securities laws. Accordingly, the Article will propose a legislative ap
proach to the regulation of foreign tender offers.
It is the position of this Article that Congress should resolve the
issue of extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws by stat
ute and, with respect to foreign tender offers, reject the broad judicially
developed tests for the application of U.S. law. 10 Instead, the U.S. regu
lations should apply only to offers for U.S. securities as defined herein. 1 1
Offers for other securities should only be subject to a minimal level of
regulation designed to advance the core value underlying tender offer
regulation--disclosure to investors-without provoking foreign bidders
to deny U.S. investors access to their offers.
II.

THE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS- AN OVERVIEW
A.

Regulation of Domestic Tender Offers

In the United States, tender offers are regulated by the Williams
Act, 1 2 which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934 ("Exchange
Act") in 1 968, and the SEC rules thereunder. The primary purpose of
the Williams Act is to protect of investors in connection with the tender
offer process. 1 3 Congress passed the Williams Act in response to a con
cern that an increasing amount of stock was being acquired through se1 0 One may also argue that, even if the judicial interpretations of congressional intent to author
ize a broad application of the federal securities laws were accurate, they do not take cognizance of
any limitation on congressional power to so authorize. There may be limits on the power of Con
gress to intrude to this degree on the interests of foreign sovereigns. See Lea Brilmayer, The Extra
territorial Application of A merican Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 J.L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 1 (Summer 1 9 87) (constitutional due process clause limits the power of Con
gress to legislate extraterritorially); Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and
Fifth Amendment Due Process, 1 05 HARV. L. REV. 1217 ( 1 992) (same).
II This Article defines U.S. securities to include three classes of securities: ( 1 ) those issued by
a
U.S. corporation; (2) those listed on a national securities exchange; and (3) those registered with the
SEC under § 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See infra note 272 and accompanying
text.

12
13

Pub. L. No. 90- 439, 82 Stat. 454 ( 1 968) (codified at 1 5 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) ( 1 992)).
See 1 1 3 CoNG. REc. 24,664 ( 1 967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("S. 5 10 is designed solely to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors.").
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cret 14 block purchases 1 5 and large rapid acquisitions. Most o f the
statutory provisions deal with the disclosure 1 6 required in connection
with a tender offer. 1 7 Congress viewed the disclosure provisions as plug
ging a loophole in the then-existing regulatory system which required
disclosure in connection with other forms of change in control such as
proxy contests. 1 8 To the statutory provisions, the SEC has added an ex
tensive body of regulation 1 9 under its rulemaking authority. 20
Regulation of tender offers under the Williams Act and the SEC
1 4 See H.R. REP. No. 1 7 1 1, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 1 2 ( 1 968) (discussing need for legislation to
combat secrecy).
1 5 The SEC has noted that the mere accumulation of a large block of stock by an investor may
have significant consequences for other investors. The existence of block holdings may affect the
speed and ease with which a potential tender offeror can acquire a beachhead position in the target
company; it may also impact upon the likely success of a prospective tender offer. See Legislative
Proposals on Tender Offers, 542 Sec. Rec. & L. Rep. (BNA) Spec. Supp. 1 5 (Feb. 27, 1 980).
1 6 Section 14(d) ( 1 5 U.S.C. § 78n(d) ( 1 992)), the primary operative provision regulating tender
offers, requires a bidder to make extensive disclosure (which disclosure has been prescribed by the
SEC in Schedule 14D - l ), prior to initiating a tender offer. The bulk of the Senate Report accompa
nying the proposed legislation emphasized that the amendments were disclosure-oriented:
The failure to provide adequate disclosure to investors in connection with a cash takeover
bid or other acquisitions which may cause a shift in control is in sharp contrast to the regulatory
requirements applicable where one company offers to exchange its shares for those of another,
or where a contest for control takes the form of a proxy fight.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1 st Sess. 2 ( 1967) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has stated
that the primary purpose of the Williams Act is to provide for disclosure of tender offer information
to shareholders. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 , 26, 27 ( 1 977) (quoting as stated
purpose of bill: "A bill to provide for full disclosure of corporate equity ownership of securities
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934.") (quoting 1 A LAN BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD§ 6.3 ( 1 2 1), at 1 1 6.2 ( 1 975)); cf Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc. , 5 68 F. Supp.
1 538, 1 545 (S.D.N.Y.) (discussing dual purposes of the Williams Act: disclosure to shareholders and
prevention of impediments to the shareholders' exercise of free choice), rev'd, 772 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1 983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 ( 1 984).
1 7 The Williams Act also ( 1 ) specifies periods during which tendering stockholders may with
draw their shares during an offer ( 1 5 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)(1 992)); (2) requires purchases in an offer
that is over-subscribed to be made on a pro rata basis ( 1 5 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6)); and (3) requires the
offeror to pay the same price for all shares purchased during the offer ( 1 5 U.S.C. § 7 8n(d)(7)).
1 8 "The cash tender offer is similar to a proxy contest, and the committee could find no reason to
continue the present gap in the Federal securities laws which leaves the cash tender offer exempt
from disclosure provisions." S. REP. No. 5 50, supra note 16, at 3. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 632 ( 1982) ("The Williams Act, passed in 1968, was the congressional response to the
increased use of cash tender offers in corporate acquisitions, a device that had 'removed a substantial
number of corporate control contests from the reach of existing disclosure requirements of the fed
eral securities laws.' ).
1 9 See, e.g. , 1 7 C.F.R. § 240. 14e- l (a) ( 1 99 1 ) (requiring the offer to remain open for at least 20
business days); 17 C.F.R. § 240 . 1 4d-IO ( 1 99 1 ) (requiring equal treatment of all shareholders); 1 7
C.F.R. § 240. 14d-7 ( 1 99 1 ) (expanding the withdrawal rights provided b y statute); 1 7 C.F.R.
§ 240. 10b- 1 3 ( 1 99 1 ) (prohibiting purchases of stock "alongside" a tender offer).
20 Tender offer jurisprudence in the United States also consists of an extensive body of case law
that attempts to define when a tender offer has been commenced, so as to trigger application of the
Williams Act. The Second Circuit has described the typical tender offer as:
[A] bid by an individual or group to buy shares of a company-usually at a price above the
current market price. Those accepting the offer are said to tender their stock for purchase. The
"

526

87:523 ( 1 993)

Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers

rules thereunder has three distinct aspects: procedural regulation of the
tender offer, disclosure requirements, and a general antifraud provision. 2 1
The procedural regulations include: the best-price rule which requires a
bidder to pay all shareholders the best price paid to any one of them ; 22
the all-holders rule which requires that all stockholders be treated
equally; 2 3 the requirement that a tender offer remain open for a statutory
period and be extended if the terms of the offer are changed; 2 4 and the
provision of withdrawal rights during the pendency of an offer. 2 5
The disclosure requirements compel the bidder to disclose certain
information about its identity, its future intentions, and the terms of the
offer to the shareholders of the target company26 and the SEC. 27
Although the focus of the disclosure requirements is on the bidder, the
requirements are not unilateral; the target company is also required to
make certain disclosures in connection with its response to the tender
offer. 28 The theory behind the disclosure requirements is that full disclo
sure would alleviate much of the evil, obviating the need for more exten
sive substantive antitakeover legislation. 29
Finally, section 1 4(e) of the Exchange Act30 contains a general
tender offer antifraud provision, similar to section lO(b)3 1 and Rule l Ob-5
thereunder. 3 2 Section 1 4(e) prohibits the use of all fraudulent, deceptive,
and manipulative acts and practices in connection with a tender offer. 33
This provision, which requires deception in the form of a misrepresentaperson making the offer obligates himself to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered
shares if certain specified conditions are met.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1 1 95, 1 206 (2d Cir. 1 978) (quoting
House Report). See also E.H.I. of Florida, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 652 F.2d 3 1 0,
3 1 5 (3d Cir. 198 1 ) (The classic definition of a tender offer is "a public invitation to a corporation's
shareholders to purchase their stock for a specified consideration.").
This Article will focus on the classic tender offer and will not address the potential application
of U.S. law to transactions that do not involve a public offer to shareholders.
2 1 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 , 22-24 ( 1 977) (describing disclosure, proce
dural protections, and antifraud provision of Williams Act).
22 See !5 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) ( 1 992); 1 7 C.F.R. § 240. 1 4d- 1 0 ( 1 99 1).
2 3 The bidder's tender offer must be open to "all security holders of the class of securities subject
to the tender offer." 1 7 C.F.R. § 240. 1 4d-IO(a)( l ) ( 1 99 1).
24 See 1 7 C.F.R. § 240. 14e- l (b) ( 1 99 1); Interpretive Release Relating to Tender Offer Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-24296, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 24,2841, at 1 7,776 (Apr. 3, 1 987).
2 5 See 1 5 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) ( 1 992); 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1 4d-7 ( 1 99 1).
26 The target company is the issuer of the securities that are the subject of the tender offer.
27 See generally SEC Schedule !4D-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14d- 1 00 ( 199 1).
28 See 1 7 C.F.R. § 240. 1 4d-9 ( 1 99 1); SEC Schedule 1 4D-9, 1 7 C.F.R. § 240. 1 4d- 1 0 1 ( 1 99 1 ).
29 See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 1 6, at 3 - 4 (explaining how disclosure requirements address
problems faced by target shareholders).
30 1 5 U.S.C. § 78n(e) ( 1 992).
3 1 1 5 u.s.c. § 78j(b) ( 1 992).
3 2 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1 0b-5 ( 1 992).
33 Section 1 4(e) also gives the SEC explicit authority to "by rules and regulations define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative." 1 5 U.S.C. § 78n(e) ( 1 99 1).
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tion or omission, 34 applies t o false statements by both the bidder and the
target, statements contained in the tender offer documents themselves,
and other statements made during the course of the tender offer. Liti
gants have used section 1 4(e) to challenge takeover attempts as well as
target company defenses, although courts have, in many instances, lim
ited private rights of action under section 14(e). 3 5 Courts have been vir
tually uniform, however, in granting the target of a tender offer standing
to sue the bidder under the Williams Act. 3 6
B.

Regulation of International Tender Offers

Whether the regulations of the Williams Act apply to a tender offer
depends in part on whether the target company is registered under the
Exchange Act. Section 1 4(e) and Regulation 1 4E apply to any tender
offer or request or any invitation for tenders. 3 7 Section 14( d)( 1) and Reg
ulation 1 4D, which contain most of the SEC's procedural requirements
as well as its disclosure provisions, are essentially limited, by their terms,
to offers for a class of equity securities registered under section 1 2 of the
Exchange Act. 3 8 Section 14(d) ( l ) applies to any offer made "by use of
the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise. " 3 9 In an
34 See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 ( 1 985) (finding § 1 4(e) aimed at
misrepresentation or nondisclosure rather than substantive fairness of a transaction).
3 5 See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 ( 1 977) (finding no private right of action
for defeated tender offeror); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.) (finding no
§ 1 4(e) claim for lost tender offer opportunity), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 ( 1 98 1).
3 6 Almost every court to consider the issue has permitted an issuer to sue under the Williams
Act, at least for injunctive relief. See, e.g. , City Capital Assocs. , Ltd. v. Interco, Inc., 860 F.2d 60
(3d Cir. 1988) (allowing issuer to challenge bidder's disclosure); Florida Commercial Banks v.
Culverhouse, 772 F.2d 1 5 1 3 , 1 5 1 9 n.2 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 985) (every circuit has held that the issuer has
standing to sue for injunctive relief); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 7 1 9 (2d Cir. 1971)
(upholding issuer standing under § 1 3 (d)), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 9 1 0 ( 1 972); American Carriers, Inc.
v. Baytree Investors, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 800, 807 (D. Kan. 1988). The Supreme Court has assumed,
without directly confronting the issue, that a private right of action was available to the issuer in
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 62 ( 1 975). Cf Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1, 42 n.28 ( 1 977) (reserving the question). But see Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987,
1 00 1 -02 (3d Cir. 1988) (denying issuer standing under all-holders rule, SEC Rule 1 4d - 1 0, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240. 14d- 10).
3 7 The SEC has indicated its belief that § 1 4(e) is fully applicable to tender offers made by for
eigners for foreign securities. See Alfred F. Conard, Tender Offer Fraud: The Secret Meaning of
Subsection 14{e), 40 Bus. LAW. 87, 95 n.30 ( 1 984) (citing SEC Release No. 3 3 - 6 1 59, [ 1 979- 1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 82,374, at 82,604 n. 1 5 (Nov. 29, 1 979)).
3 8 Section 12 requires registration of any class of equity securities listed on a national stock
exchange or held by a substantial number of investors. Pursuant to its statutory authority, the SEC
has exempted foreign issuers from the registration requirements of § 12 if they have fewer than 300
resident holders or if they meet the exemptive requirements of SEC Rule 1 2g3-2. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240. 1 2g3-2 (1992).
3 9 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)( l ) (1992). At least one commentator has suggested that Congress in
tended the jurisdictional restrictions present elsewhere in the Exchange Act to apply to § ! 4(e). See
Conard, supra note 37. The SEC has indicated that, in its opinion, § 14(e) applies broadly. See
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international tender offer, 40 an issue arises as to who is entitled to regu
late that offer. The answer may depend on a number of factors: where
the bidder and the target company are incorporated; where the securities
of the bidder are listed and traded; whether the securities of the bidder
are owned, in part, by nonresident investors ; and where the offer is made.
Generally, the country with primary interest in regulating a tender offer
is the target's home country or the country under whose laws the target
is incorporated. 4 1 Many countries, including the United States, also reg
ulate offers and transactions in foreign securities that occur within their
borders. 42 Accordingly, if the target has foreign investors, a bidder who
makes a tender offer to those foreign investors may be subjecting itself to
the tender offer regulations not merely of the target's home country but
of the countries in which the foreign investors reside.
This creates several problems. One is the risk of conflicting tender
offer procedural requirements. Tender offer regulation frequently speci
fies the timing of the offer, the class of offerees to which the offer must be
made, the ability of the bidder to modify the offer, and the availability of
withdrawal rights. For example, it is not possible for an offer to comply
simultaneously with the procedural regulations of the United Kingdom
and the United States. 43 Absent modification of the regulations by the
appropriate authorities, it would be impossible to make a tender offer
that is legal in both countries. 44
Countries also have different requirements for the substance of
tender offer disclosure. For example, accounting principles are not a sub
ject of universal accord; the financial principles by which a foreign corpoTender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 1 6, 384, [ 1 979- 1 980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) � 82,373, at 82,5 8 1 (Nov. 29, 1 979). Former Commissioner Karmel expressed disagreement
with this statement, indicating that the SEC rules adopted pursuant to § 14(e) should "be subject to
clearly defined jurisdictional limits." Id. at 82,58 1 n.8.
40 For purposes of this Article, an international tender offer is defined as an offer made in more
than one country or in which the bidder, the target company, and the target company's investors are
of at least two different nationalities.
4 1 See Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 8 1 ,746. It is clear, however, that in this age of
internationalization of securities markets, states other than the home country have an interest in
regulating the tender offer. The target company's stock may, for example, be listed on stock ex
changes in other countries. Still other countries may have citizens who own target company securi
ties. The bidder may send offering documents through the mails to those citizens. Additionally, the
offer may have indirect effects on the economy of a foreign state. The target company may produce
goods or services that it sells abroad, or it may have subsidiaries operating and employing workers in
other countries. All these countries may be affected by a tender offer or merger involving the target
company.
42 For example, Canada, France, and Japan all apply their tender offer regulations to bids for
foreign companies if the foreign company has sufficient domestic ownership. See Tender Offer Re
lease, supra note 2, at 8 1 ,746.
43 See infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
44 See Concept Release on Multinational Tender and Exchange Offers, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-28093, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 84,606, at 80,873 (June 6, 1 990)
[hereinafter "Concept Release").
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ration maintains its books and records do not comply with U.S.
disclosure requirements. 45 Similarly, many foreign countries place a very
different weight on financial privacy concerns. 46 United States disclosure
rules, which do not reflect the same concerns, may violate the principles
or even the laws of such sovereigns. These issues are multiplied in the
case of exchange offers, in which the bidder must be in compliance not
merely with the tender offer disclosure requirements but with the rules
governing a public offering of securities. 47
Finally, the regulation of a tender offer by more than one sovereign
increases both the costs and uncertainties associated with the offer. It
may result in delay of the offer, as the bidder must discover and meet the
conditions imposed by different regulations. It also increases the number
of jurisdictions in which the bidder may be sued for noncompliance with
tender offer rules, for misrepresentations, or for substantive objections to
the offer. Importantly, since different states have different policy objec
tives inherent in their tender offer regulations, a bidder's exposure to liti
gation is likely to multiply substantially if its offer is regulated by more
than one state. 4 8
These problems are particularly true under U.S. regulation of a
45 See, e.g. , Linda C. Quinn, Remarks at American Institute of Certified Public Accountants'
Nineteenth Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments, in Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 1482, at 13 (Jan. 1 5 , 1 992) (substantial differences in international accounting systems
have impeded progress by the SEC and other countries towards common disclosure requirements);
see also Letter from Shoichiro Toyoda, President, Toyota Motor Corporation, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 25, 1991) (on file with author) (under current
disclosure laws, Toyota would have to keep two types of accounting records to meet requirements of
U.S and Japan).
46 See, e.g. , Bernard F. Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United
States, 14 N Ew ENG. L. REV. 1 8, 22 ( 1 978) (right to financial privacy is more firmly established in
civil law jurisdictions than in the United States); Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Cou rse:
Hurdling Barriers to Transnational Financial Services, 1 50 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 137 ( 1 992) (differ
ing regulatory schemes with respect to privacy impede uniform regulation of computer data); Marc
G. Corrado, Comment, The Supreme Court's Impact on Swiss Banking Secrecy: Societe Nationale
lndustrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 37 AM . U. L. REV. 827, 828 ( 1 988) (dis
cussing different policies with respect to financial privacy in the United States and abroad).
47 These rules would presumably require that the new security offering be registered under the
provisions of the Securities Act. See S. REP. No. 5 50, supra note 1 6, at 3:
Where one company seeks control of another by means of a stock-for-stock exchange, the offer
must be registered under the Securities Act of 1 933. The shareholder gets a prospectus setting
forth all material facts about the offer. He knows who the purchaser is, and what plans have
been made for the company.
!d.
48 At one point, the SEC, recognizing the substantial costs imposed by the system of tender offer
regulation under the Williams Act, requested comment on a provision that would allow firms to opt
out of some or all of the tender offer regulations. See Acquisitions of Substantial Amounts of Securi
ties and Related Activities Undertaken During and Following a Tender Offer for Those Securities,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-24976, [ 1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 8 1 , 1 60, at
88,87 1 -72 (Oct. 1 , 1 987); Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Ex
change Act Release No. 34-23486, [ 1 986- 1 987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 84,0 1 8,
at 88,207 (July 3 1 , 1 986). The recognition by the SEC that, in some cases, deregulation could prove
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tender offer. Because the United States has an extensive system of securi
ties regulation, coupled with a generous policy of providing private rights
of action to enforce that system, 49 litigation plays a major role in most
battles for corporate control. 5 ° Furthermore, U.S. litigation tends to be
more intrusive, more time-consuming, and more costly than litigation in
other countries.
As a result, foreign bidders are loathe to engage in conduct 5 1 that
will require them to submit to and comply with U.S. law. 5 2 American
investors have nonetheless chosen to go abroad and purchase securities
that are net offered and sold in the United States. Investors have also
developed methods of purchasing foreign securities indirectly when the
securities are not marketed in the United States. 53 Consequently, securieconomically beneficial to firms lends credibility to the less-intrusive regulatory structures of other
countries.
49 See, e.g. , Sachs, supra note 7, at 677 n.3.
5 0 This is perhaps an understatement. The use of litigation as a defensive tactic in hostile con
tests for corporate control is becoming increasingly widespread. See Michael Rosenzweig, Target
Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1 10 (1 986) (analyzing the use of litigation by target management as a
defensive response to a tender offer). As the court observed in Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc.,
744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984), "Elaborate strategies and ingenious tactics have been developed both to
facilitate takeover attempts and to defend against them. Skirmishes are fought in company boar
drooms, in shareholders' meetings, and, with increasing regularity, in the courts." Jd. at 258. Liti
gation is a potent defensive tool because of the delay and uncertainty it adds to a lawsuit. See Marc
P. Cherno & Sandra F. Coppola, Use of Litigation as a Takeover Defense, in I SECURITIES LITIGA
TION 245, 247 (ALI-ABA 1988); Jerold S. Solovy et a!., The Role ofLitigation in Control Contests, in
HoSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1988: THE NEW MARKET ENVIRONMENT 787
(PLI 1 988) (discussing the strategic effect of litigation in delaying and possibly defeating a tender
offer).
See also Memorandum of General Electric Company PLC at 2, Plessey Co. PLC v. General
Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986) (No. 85-76 1 ) (characterizing Plessey's litigation as a
"transparent effort to delay or disrupt" General Electric's tender offer), cited in Gavin G. McCabe,
Note, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities Law in the A bsence of Fraud Charges: Ples
sey v. GEC, 1 8 L AW & P oL ' Y lNT'L Bus. 649, 660 n.48 ( 1 986).
5 1 This phenomenon is not limited to tender offers; many foreign issuers, for example, have
avoided U.S. capital markets in order to escape the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933 as well as concomitant litigation.
52 See Roberta S. Kannel, SEC Regulation of Multijurisdictional Ofef rings, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 3, 6 ( 1 990). The SEC has promulgated a rule providing a safe-harbor exemption from the regis
tration requirements of the 1933 Act for certain private placements of foreign securities to qualified
U.S. investors. See SEC Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230. 144A ( 1 991). Rule 144A was intended to
attract foreign issuers to the United States by making it easier to enter the private placement market,
and the SEC has indicated that, since its enactment in April, 1 990, the Rule has resulted in approxi
mately four billion dollars of securities relating to foreign issuers being sold in the United States. See
Staff Report on Rule 144A, [ 199 1 - 1 992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 84,9 1 8, at
82,4 1 1 (Jan. 29, 1992).
Rule 144A applies solely to the registration requirements of the 1 933 Act and not to the an
tifraud provisions. See Preliminary Note 1 , Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230. 144A ( 1 99 1 ).
5 3 These methods include the use of trustees in the foreign country who hold the stock for a U.S.
investor as beneficial owner, and the creation of American Depository Receipts. An American De
pository Receipt ("ADR") is a security issued by a bank against the bank's holding of securities in a
foreign company. The ADR provides one of the principal means by which U.S. residents can invest
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ties of a foreign target company that are not traded on a national ex
change or marketed within the United States may be partially held by
U.S. investors.
Tender offer bidders have attempted to deal with the target's U.S.
shareholders in several ways. One option is simply to make the offer
directly to U.S. shareholders and to comply with the Williams Act. Even
if there are no inconsistencies between the Williams Act and the law of
the home country, however, an offer in the United States is costly, im
poses significant burdens of disclosure, and creates the risk of litigation.
Accordingly, the bidder may prefer to avoid making the tender offer in
the United States. When the number of shares owned by U.S. holders is
sufficiently small, making tender of the shares unnecessary to the success
of the offer, a foreign bidder can frequently avoid the cost and difficulty
of compliance with the U.S. regulations by making an offer that is not
open to U.S. residents. 54 The SEC has observed that this exclusion of
U.S. investors is the foreign bidders' method of choice in situations in
which U.S. shareholdings are not necessary for the success of the
offering. 55
In order to exclude U.S. shareholders, it is common for the bidder to
in securities that are not traded in the United States directly. See Securities Act Release No. 6894,
Exchange Act Release No. 29,226, (1 990- 1 99 1 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 84,740,
at 8 1 , 586-87 (May 23, 1991). ADRs are traded in the United States in the same manner as domestic
securities and may be listed on a national exchange or traded in the over-the-counter market. !d. at
8 1 , 590. The ADR purchaser typically acquires the right to the dividends paid by the foreign com
pany, but the depository retains discretion as to the method of distribution and as to the provision of
voting rights. !d. at 8 1 ,598.
Although ADRs are treated as securities for purposes of regulation under the federal securities
laws, the creation of an ADR facility need not involve the issuer. ADR facilities are generally
described as either "unsponsored" or "sponsored. " Unsponsored facilities are developed by the de
pository in response to a perception of investor interest. A depository may establish an ADR facility
without the participation or cooperation of the issuer of the deposited securities. Jd. at 8 1 ,588.
Alternatively, the ADR facility may be "sponsored," that is, established jointly by an issuer and a
depository. In the case of a sponsored facility, the issuer usually bears some of the costs relating to
the depository and agrees to provide certain information and notices to ADR holders. Jd. Sponsor
ship in and of itself does not affect the reporting and registration requirements of the federal securi
ties laws. Jd.
54 One of the more highly publicized examples of this was Sir James Goldsmith's bid for B.A.T.
Industries in the fall of 1 989, which bid was expressly designed to exclude U.S. shareholders. See,
e.g. , Letter from SEC Chairman David S. Ruder to Congressman Harold Rogers (Sept. 6, 1 989)
[hereinafter "Ruder Letter"], discussed in 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1 399 (Sept. 1 5, 1989);
Laurie P. Cohen, Goldsmith is Shunning U.S. Media, Seeking to Keep B.A. T. Bid From Snags, WALL
ST. J., July 1 8, 1 989, at B6; Kurt Eichenwald, U.S. Concern On B.A. T. Bid by Goldsmith, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. I I , 1 989, at D l .
5 5 Tender Offer Release, supra note 2 , at 8 1 ,743 (foreign offers "routinely have excluded share
holders resident in the United States where their holdings were not necessary for the success of the
offering"); Concept Release, supra note 44, at 80,8 7 1 (foreign bidders have, in a number of cases,
attempted to avoid jurisdiction and exclude U.S. investors from an offer where the number of U.S.
investors is small, because of the costs, in both time and dollars, of compliance with an additional
regulatory system).
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take a number of precautions. The bidder does not mail offering docu
ments into the United States, announce the offer in the U.S. press, or
accept tenders made from the United States. The bidder hopes, in this
way, to avoid application of U.S. law, on the theory that the law only
applies to offers made in the United States. 5 6
If the bidder succeeds in excluding U.S. investors from the offer,
such investors are barred, by the terms of the offer, from tendering their
shares to the bidder directly. If they want to tender their shares, they
bear the increased costs of arranging to have them tendered from outside
the United States or selling them into the international arbitrage mar
ket. 57 Either procedure causes U.S. investors to incur substantial trans
action costs. Furthermore, if the tender offer is an exchange offer, U.S.
investors' inability to participate directly will preclude them from contin
uing to participate in the resulting company. 5 8
In addition, U.S. investors must make this decision in the absence of
the traditional Williams Act disclosure and often without even the bene
fit of the disclosure provided by foreign law. 59 The mailing of offering
documents into the United States might trigger application of U.S. law;
accordingly, bidders who wish to avoid the application of this law do not
communicate at all with U.S. residents. 6° Frequently, U.S. investors do
not even receive information on the procedures for tendering that may be
available, such as tendering from outside the United States. 6 1
In some cases, complete exclusion of U.S. holders from the offer is
not possible. The number of target shares owned by U.S. residents may
be sufficiently large that success of the offer requires a tender by those
shareholders. Additionally, the laws of the home country may require
that the offer be communicated to all shareholders or that the offer pro
vide equal treatment for both resident and foreign holders. 62 In either
case, the bidder must deal with U.S. law. Several recent bidders have
5 6 In Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1 986), the District
Court of Delaware held that such steps, taken by General Electric, were sufficient to avoid applica
tion of the U.S. securities laws. See infra notes 1 35-39 and accompanying text.
57 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
5 8 The SEC has observed that U.S. shareholders excluded from a foreign tender offer have the
option of selling into the market at substantial cost or retaining their minority shareholder status
with the possibility of reduced liquidity and possibly being frozen out in a subsequent merger. See
Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 81,744.
5 9 According to the SEC:
U.S. investors not only can be deprived of the opportunity to realize significant value on their
investments in foreign securities by tendering into a favorable offer, they also must decide
whether to retain their securities or sell into the secondary market without the disclosure and
procedural safeguards afforded by the regulatory scheme applicable in the U.S. or in the rele
vant foreign jurisdiction.
Concept Release, supra note 44, at 80,872.
60 Even sophisticated investors who are able to gain access to the offering documents must incur
additional costs in doing so.
6 1 See Concept Release, supra note 44, at 80,87 1 .
62 Cf Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 8 7 1 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir.) (British
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negotiated with the SEC to produce transaction structures that comply
with both U. S. law and the law of the home country. Although this
negotiation makes it possible for the offer to proceed, it is a costly and
uncertain mechanism to use on a case-by-case basis. In addition, it essen
tially requires the bidder to submit to U.S. regulation.
Submission to U.S. regulation subjects the offer, among other things,
to the uncertainty of interference through litigation under the Williams
Act. A suit under the Williams Act, which might be initiated by the
target or investors, may demand that the bidder comply with the proce
dural and disclosure provisions of the Williams Act or seek injunctive
relief under section 1 4(e). Even if the bidder deliberately excludes U.S.
shareholders, a court may find that the offer has a sufficient effect on the
United States to justify imposition of U.S. laws. 6 3
Ill.

CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE APPLICABILITY OF
A.

U.S.

LAW

The SEC Proposals

Both the SEC and the courts have addressed the application of the
U.S. securities laws to international securities transactions. Because it is
difficult, if not impossible, to comply simultaneously with U.S. law and
the requirements of many foreign countries, bidders frequently request
that the SEC exempt them from some of the conflicting elements of U.S.
law before making an offer. The SEC has received an increasing number
of such requests, which it has traditionally handled through individually
structured transactions. Based on these experiences, the SEC has devel
oped two proposals for a uniform approach to U.S. regulation of foreign
tender offers.
Negotiated Transaction Structures Two well-known examples
1.
of the individually structured approach are the Ford-Jaguar64 and
Procordia- Volvo-Pharmacia 6 5 transactions. In both instances, negotia
tion between the bidder and the SEC resulted in a deal structured as two
separate tender offers, one of which was made in the United States and
the other abroad. The U.S. tender offer was made in general compliance
with the Williams Act; the foreign offer complied with the applicable
foreign law which was, in both cases, the law of the target company's
home country. The SEC permitted this dual structure and granted ex
emptions from certain procedural requirements of the Williams Act to
.-

nominee banks that received tender offer documents were required by law to forward tender offer
documents to shareholders in the United States), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 ( 1 989).
63 See id. at 2 6 1 -62.
64 In the Matter of Ford-Jaguar, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27,425, 1 989 SEC LEXIS 2 1 6 1
(Nov. 7 , 1 989) [hereinafter "Ford Release").
6 5 In the Matter of Precordia Aktiebolag and Aktiebolaget Volvo, Exchange Act Release No.
34-2767 1 , [ 1 989-1990 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 84, 5 1 4 (Feb. 2, 1 990) [hereinafter
"Precordia Release").
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allow the offer to proceed and to minimize the conflict with foreign law. 66
In Ford-Jaguar, Ford U.K. sought to acquire Jaguar, a company
organized under the laws of the United Kingdom. Approximately
twenty-five percent of Jaguar's stock was owned by Americans indirectly
through ADRs, 6 7 and a small amount was owned by U.S. residents di
rectly. 68 Due to conflicts between the Williams Act and the U.K. City
Code on Tender Offers, 69 it was impossible for Ford to design a tender
offer that would meet the procedural requirements of both statutes. In
particular, although U.S. tender offer regulations require the bidder to
provide withdrawal rights throughout the offering period, 70 the rules in
the United Kingdom do not permit withdrawal rights during the initial
twenty-one days of the offer. 7 1 The U.K provisions also require the offer
to be extended for an additional fourteen day period after it has gone
"unconditional as to acceptances. " 7 2
Ford sought to resolve this conflict by structuring its transaction as
two separate offers. Ford would make one offer to U.S. shareholders in
which it would follow the procedures required by the Williams Act. U.S.
shareholders would tender into this offer. Simultaneously, Ford would
make a non-U.S. offer, on the same terms, to non-U.S. Jaguar sharehold
ers. 7 3 The non-U. S . offer would comply with the U.K. City Code. The
SEC agreed to this bifurcated structure. It granted Ford no-action relief
66 The SEC is authorized by statute to exempt from the provisions of § 1 4(d) transactions that
are "not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection." 1 5 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8) ( 1 992). In
addition, the SEC has the power to modify the requirements of particular statutory provisions and
rules under specific provisions such as § 1 4(d)(5), which authorizes the SEC to modify statutory
withdrawal rights. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) ( 1 992).
67 The stock was on deposit at the Bank of New York, Jaguar's ADR facility.
68 See Ford Release, supra note 64, at *2. Elizabeth Jacobs, The Ford-Jaguar Deal: A New
Model for U. S. - U. K. Takeovers, INSIGHTS, Feb. 1990, at 3.
69 Tender offers in the United Kingdom are regulated by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers.
The legal requirements for tender offers are set out in the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.
Although this Code does not have legal force, noncompliance can lead to sanctions by a U.K. self
regulatory agency. See Jacobs, supra note 68; Internationalization of the Securities Markets, Report
of the SEC to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the House Com
mittee on Energy and Commerce, III-255-56 (July 27, 1987).
70
71

See supra note 25.

PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (GREAT BRITAIN ) , CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF SHARES Rule 34 (3d ed.
1990) [hereinafter "CITY Co D E ]. Only if the offer has not gone "unconditional as to acceptances"
"

after 42 days are withdrawal rights granted. !d.
For a detailed description of the City Code, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice
and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 9 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 693, app. A ( 1 985); Deborah A.
DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British, 5 8 N.Y. U. L. REV. 945
( 1 983).
72 CITY CODE, supra note 7 1 , Rule 3 1 .4. For an explanation of the difference between the City
Code withdrawal rules and those of the Williams Act, see Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at
8 1 ,76 1 -62.
73 See Ford Release, supra note 64, at *4.
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from the all-holders provisions of Rule 1 4d- 1 074 and from certain of the
provisions governing withdrawal rights. 75
In Procordia- Volvo-Pharmacia, two Swedish companies, Procordia
and Volvo, sought to acquire Pharrnacia Aktiebolag, a Swedish company
affiliated with Volvo. 76 Pharrnacia was registered under Section 1 2 of the
Exchange Act, as about eight percent of its equity was held by U.S. in
vestors, either directly or indirectly through ADRs. 77 The bidders again
sought to structure their bid so as to extend a separate offer to U . S . inves
tors because provisions of Swedish law were inconsistent with the Wil
liams Act. 7 8 The SEC agreed to the structure and granted the requested
no-action relief. 79
Significantly, although the bidders in both cases claimed that their
negotiation with the United States did not constitute a submission to U.S.
jurisdiction or an agreement that U.S. law applied, neither sought a dec
laration from the SEC that the Williams Act was inapplicable. 8 0 Nor did
the bidders attempt to evade U.S. jurisdiction by not making the offer in
the United States. It appears that the number of U.S. investors was large
enough to require the bidders to extend offers to U.S. holders. 8 1 As a
result, the bidders incurred the costs of making two separate offers, nego
tiating with the SEC, and subjecting themselves to the possibility of liti
gation under the antifraud provisions.
U.S.

74 This relief was necessary for Ford to structure its offer as two separate offers. Id. at *3. See
also Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 8 1 ,762.
75 See Ford Release, supra note 64, at *4; see also Concept Release, supra note 44, at 8 1 ,744.
7 6 See Procordia Release, supra note 65.
77 See id. at 80,584.
7 8 Both Procordia and Volvo were subject to the tender offer regulations of the Recommendation
Concerning Public Offers to Purchase Shares, a comprehensive set of procedural and disclosure
requirements for tender offers modeled after the U.K. City Code. The Recommendation was
promulgated by the Joint Committee of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of
Swedish Industries. Procordia and Volvo were subject to the Recommendation because of their
listing on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. See id.
79 See id. at 80,586.
80 See id. at 80,585 (bidders request for relieO; Ford Release, supra note 64, at *4. The bidders
appeared to take the position that an offer which is made available to United States investors is
presumably an offer made in the United States, for purposes of the Williams Act.
8 1 Approximately 25% of Jaguar's shares were beneficially owned by U.S. residents. See supra
note 67. The Procordia offer was subject to the condition that Procordia acquire at least 90% of the
shares of Pharmacia. The presence of a large number of U.S. shareholders in the target company
may result in pressure both from the SEC and the target company to open the offer in the United
States. This was likely the case in the recent tender offer by RMV Acquisition, Inc. for Vulcan
Packaging, Inc. Although both the issuer and target were Canadian companies, U.S. investors rep
resented half of Vulcan's shareholders and owned 28% of its stock. RMV Acquisition Inc. & Vul
can Packaging Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [ 1 988-1 989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) �
78,899, at 78,490 (Nov. 2, 1 988). Although RMV's original offer was made only in Canada and did
not comply with the Williams Act, RMV responded to pressure by SEC staff and Vulcan directors
and extended a parallel offer to U.S. nationals. Id. ; Michael D. Mann & Joseph G. Mari, Develop
ment in Inrernational Securities Law Enforcement, in CORP. L. & P RAC COURSE HANDBOOK SE 
RIES (PLI 1990), available in WESTLAW, SEC Library, at *39.
.
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2.
The Exemption Proposals. -The Ford-Jaguar and Procordia
Volvo-Pharmacia transactions indicated to potential bidders that the SEC
was receptive to the negotiation process and would not insist on rigid
compliance with U.S. law as a condition for permitting foreign-based
tender offers to be made in the United States. Other corporations rapidly
began to use these transactions as a model, and an increasing number of
foreign bidders sought similar exemptive relief. 82 Nevertheless, the bur
dens of compliance with U.S. law, even under the negotiated structure,
were substantial. 8 3 Hence, the SEC's willingness to negotiate was not
enough to cause bidders, who did not otherwise need to purchase the
shares owned by U.S. investors, to open their offers to such investors. 84
The SEC observed that the exclusion of U.S. investors from a for
eign offer was a matter of serious concern. 8 5 Exclusion meant that U.S.
investors were not able to tender and to receive the tender offer premium.
In addition, the efforts by foreign bidders to avoid triggering application
of U.S. law reduced the information available to U.S. investors about the
transaction. 86
In response to these concerns, the SEC developed two proposals.
On June 6, 1 990, the SEC issued a Concept Release on Multinational
Tender and Exchange Offers. 8 7 The stated purpose of the Concept Re
lease was to propose an approach under which foreign bidders would be
encouraged to include U.S. investors in their tender offers, and to facili
tate the making of such offers in cases where the number of U.S. mves
tors was small. 88

82 See Breeden Reassures Capitol Hill with SEC's Foreign Tender Offer Proposal, SEC. WK., June
4, 1990, at I, I (quoting Commissioner Mary Schapiro to the effect that the SEC proposal was
influenced by an increasing number of corporate requests for no-action relief).
8 3 See Concept Release, supra note 44, at 80,874.
84 See Tom Doggett, SEC's Breeden Seeks Comment on Exempting Foreign Takeovers from
Tender Offer Regulations, INVESTMENT DEALER's DIGEST, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS REP., May
7, 1 990, at I , I (citing remarks of Chairman Breeden before Institute on Acquisitions and
Takeovers).
8 5 The SEC also recognized a number of issues raised by multinational tender offers. First, the
procedural requirements imposed by a foreign sovereign may be different or even directly in conflict
with those of the Williams Act, making it difficult or impossible to design a single tender offer that
will comply with both. Concept Release, supra note 44, at 80,874. Second, the disclosure require
ments of U.S. law impose substantial burdens on a foreign bidder. In addition to the disclosure
required in connection with the offer directly, U.S. rules require registration if the offer is an ex
change offer, and the registration process requires, inter alia, reconciliation with U.S. accounting
principles. !d. Finally, foreign bidders are particularly leery of involvement with the United States
in the tender offer context because of the broad reach of domestic antifraud provisions, including
both §§ 14(e) and I O(b). The willingness of U.S. courts to apply the antifraud provisions to overseas
transactions, the broad nature of the provisions themselves and available remedies thereunder, and
the expensive and burdensome nature of litigation in the United States all militate against U.S.
involvement by the bidder.
86 See supra notes 54-6 1 and accompanying text.
87 Concept Release, supra note 44.
88 /d. at 80,87 1 .
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The Release focused on several concepts. The first was disclosure.
The Release questioned whether U.S. disclosure regulations should be
imposed upon all foreign offers or whether, if the number of U . S . inves
tors was limited, compliance with foreign disclosure requirements would
provide sufficient protection. 8 9 The SEC recognized the need to balance
two objectives in the protection of investors: ( 1 ) insuring that investors
receive adequate information to make a decision; and (2) insuring that
investors have the opportunity to decide. 90 Presumably the SEC realized
that there is little value in requiring compliance with American disclo
sure rules if foreign bidders respond by closing their offers to U.S.
citizens. 9 1
In the case of international tender offers involving a substantial pro
portion of U.S. investors, the SEC proposed increased development of
the multijurisdictional disclosure concept ("MJDS"), 92 a concept which
has recently been adopted for transactions involving U.S. and Canadian
companies. 93 The SEC also sought comments on the feasibility of al
lowing tender offers in which the proportion of U.S. securityholders is
small 94 to proceed entirely on the basis of the applicable home country's
law. 95
The Release described the negotiation processes that had been em
ployed in past tender offers (such as Ford-Jaguar and Procordia- Volvo
Pharmacia) to reconcile foreign and domestic procedural requirements.96
89
90
91

Jd. at 80,875.
Jd.
The SEC was skeptical of the proposition that a bidder could avoid the application of the
Williams Act by closing an offer to U.S. investors. See id. at 80,872 n.2 ("The tender offer provisions
of the Williams Act are extraterritorial in scope . . . . Moreover, the application of the antifraud
provisions . . . does not depend upon whether U.S. securityholders are included in an offer, or
whether the tender offer is required to comply with Regulation 1 4D or 14E.").
9 2 See id. at 80,872.
9 3 See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Report
ing System for Canadian Issuers, Exchange Act Release Nos. 29,3 54, 29,355; International Series
Rei. Nos. 29 1 , 292, ( 1 99 1 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) �� 84, 8 1 2-84, 8 1 3 (June 2 1 ,
1 99 1) [hereinafter "MJDS Releases").
Under the MJDS system, disclosure is subject to a predetermined set of rules acceptable to the
securities regulators in both countries. The MJDS system adopted for Canadian issuers permits
offers for Canadian issuers to proceed under Canadian law so long as U.S. investors hold less than
40% of the securities that are the subject of the tender. The exemption from the provisions of the
Williams Act only applies if the offer is open to all U.S. securityholders upon terms and conditions
no less favorable than those offered elsewhere. See id at 8 1 ,874. The system also provides exemption
from the restrictions of Rules ! Ob-6 and lOb- 1 3 for participants in a Canadian tender offer. See id at
8 1 , 876; Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 8 1 ,759. The MJDS provisions explicitly provide that
transactions under the system will still be subject to civil liability and the antifraud provisions of the
U.S. securities laws, including § 14(e) of the Exchange Act. See MJDS Releases, supra note 93, at
8 1 , 880.
94 The SEC sought public comment on what threshold of U.S. ownership should be applied. See
Concept Release, supra note 44, at 80,875.
9 5 Jd.
96 See id. at 80,873-74.
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Typically these strategies involve the bidder structuring the offer as two
distinct transactions: one in the foreign jurisdiction and one in the United
States. Although the U.S. transaction is designed to comply with the
U.S. procedural rules, the SEC has been willing to waive compliance
with certain requirements under the Williams Act, such as the all-hold
ers rule, so long as the offer, in the view of the SEC, provides the protec
tions which are the focus of those requirements. 9 7
The Release explicitly declined to consider a broader safe-harbor
provision that would protect foreign bidders from exposure to civil or
criminal liability under the antifraud provisions of the Williams Act.93
The SEC recognized that the continued risk of such liability might repre
sent a deficiency in its approach and requested comment on whether the
conceptual approach, as outlined in the Release, would encourage for
eign bidders to forgo attempts to avoid jurisdiction or whether the possi
bility of antifraud liability would continue to provide a sufficient
deterrent to foreign bidders. 99
The following year, the SEC elaborated on the Concept Release with
a Tender Offer Release which contained proposed exemptive rules and
registration procedures designed to facilitate the inclusion of U.S. inves
tors in offers for a foreign target company's securities. 1 00 In the Tender
Offer Release, issued on June 5, 199 1 , the SEC indicated that commenta
tors had expressed overwhelming concern about the exclusion of U.S.
investors from international tender offers and had "endorsed the view
that U.S investors would be better served by their inclusion in the offer,
even where they have to rely on a foreign regulatory scheme." 1 0 1
The Release acknowledged that exclusion o f U.S. investors was fre
quently due to the costs of compliance with U.S. law. As the SEC ex
plained: "When excluded from participation in a tender or exchange
offer, U.S. holders are denied the opportunity to receive a significant pre
mium for their shares or participate in what may be an attractive invest
ment opportunity . " 1 02 The proposal was designed to encourage foreign
bidders and issuers to extend their offers to U.S. investors. 1 03
The proposal would relax previous SEC positions regarding applica
tion of the disclosure and procedural requirements to foreign offers be
yond the limits of the negotiated transactions. In cases involving a
foreign tender offer 104 where U.S. securityholders own less than ten per97 See supra section Ill.A. 1 .
9 8 See Concept Release, supra note 44, at 80,876 (specific inquiry 8).
99 !d.
1 00 See Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 8 1 ,74 1 - 42 .
101 Jd. a t 8 1 , 744.
1 02 Jd. at 8 1 ,743.
103 Id. at 8 1 ,746.
104 A foreign offer was defined as an offer for a foreign issuer's securities irrespective of the na
tionality of the bidder. See id. at 8 1 ,74 7 (nationality of bidder would not determine application of
rules).
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cent of the class of securities subject to the offer, the SEC proposed to
exempt the transaction from virtually all the procedural and disclosure
requirements-including the filing and dissemination requirements, and
the rules regarding proration, minimum offering period, and withdrawal
rights 105 -provided certain minimal requirements were met. 1 06
The Release also proposed exemption from Securities Act registra
tion for certain exchange offers. In lieu of regulation under the Williams
Act, the SEC would defer to the tender offer regulations of the foreign
target's home jurisdiction. 10 7 In sum, the proposal sought to impose
single jurisdictional regulation of multinational tender offers with the
presumption that, if the target has less than ten percent U.S. securi
tyholders, the appropriate jurisdiction to regulate the offer would be the
home jurisdiction of the target company . 10 8
With respect to the antifraud provisions, the Release was explicit.
The antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act would continue to apply to
otherwise exempted transactions. 10 9 Although the SEC recognized the
concern expressed by many commentators that application of the an
tifraud provisions alone was sufficient to inhibit bidders from opening
their offers to U.S. holders, 1 1 0 it was not moved by that concern. 1 1 1 The
10 5
106

See Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 8 1 ,744 (summarizing exemption provisions).
These requirements include the submission of an English language translation of the offering
materials to the SEC in cases that would otherwise be subject to Regulation 1 4D or Rule 1 3e- 4 ( 1 5
C.F.R. § 240. 1 3e- 4 ( 1 992)), treatment of U.S. securityholders on terms at least as favorable as those
offered other holders, and dissemination of the offer to U.S. holders on an equal basis as foreign
holders.
107 The SEC defined home jurisdiction "to mean the jurisdiction of incorporation, organization or
chartering of the foreign target company." Id. at 8 1 ,746 (quoting Proposed Rule 802(a)(4) to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.802(a)(4)). However, the SEC explained that one factor it would also
consider in determining a target company's home jurisdiction is the location of the majority of
securityholders. See id. at 8 1 ,746 n.42.
10 8 Although the proposal provides that the nationality of the bidder would not determine the
applicability of these rules, the SEC requested comment on the appropriateness of applying the ex
clusion to U.S. bidders. See id. at 8 1 ,747.
A significant aspect of the exemption provision in the Tender Offer Release was the SEC's
suggestion that the percent of U.S. securityholders be calculated based on the securities held of
record by U.S. holders. Id. at 8 1 ,747. Under the proposal, ADRs held by U.S. residents are treated
as ordinary shares for purposes of the calculation. !d. at 8 1 ,747- 48. In order to increase predictabil
ity of the application of U.S. law, the proposal would amend the reporting requirements for foreign
issuers under the securities laws to require disclosure, on an annual basis, of the extent to which a
foreign issuer's stock is held by U.S. holders. Id. at 8 1 ,748.
109 Jd. at 8 1 ,750.
I 10 See, e.g. , Letter from American Bar Association Section of Business Law, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (September 20, 1 990) [hereinafter "ABA Let
ter"] (on file with author) (stating that greatest obstacle to foreign bidders' use of SEC's conceptual
approach will be application of antifraud provisions to foreign bids).
1 1 I The SEC stated that bidders who engage in fraud would likely be liable anyway, under the
laws of the target's home country as well as the United States. Accordingly, the SEC concluded:
"These provisions should not serve to inhibit an offeror from including U.S. securityholders in the
tender offe r." Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 8 1 ,750.
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SEC reiterated its position that the federal antifraud provisions apply to
foreign offers, even if the offer is not made in the United States, "given
the foreseeable effect of the fraud in the United States. " 1 1 2 The signifi
cance of this position is that the SEC will treat foreign offers as subject to
U.S. law and subject to challenge in U.S. courts. 1 1 3 The proposal there
fore does not address the substantial risk that U.S. litigation will deter
offers by foreign bidders.
B.

The Judicial Approach

The SEC's position, which it has retained throughout its examina
tion of the regulation of foreign tender offers, is that the U.S. securities
laws presumptively apply wherever the offer is made so long as the offer
is conducted in or has an effect in the United States. 1 1 4 This position is
supported by recent cases holding that the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws are to be applied broadly to international transac
tions. The courts have concluded that they may apply U.S. law to for
eign transactions that have an effect on the United States or U.S.
investors and transactions in which there is domestic conduct.
1.
Judicial Tests for the Extraterritorial Application of the Securi
ties La ws. The leading case on the application of U.S. law to a foreign
tender offer is Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S A. 1 1 5 Gold
Fields involved a takeover attempt initiated in the United Kingdom by a
Luxembourgian bidder, Minorco, 1 1 6 who sought, through a tender offer,
to gain control over a British target, Consolidated Gold Fields. 1 1 7
Neither the stock of Minorco nor that of Gold Fields was traded on any
U.S. stock exchange, 1 1 8 although U.S. investors owned some Gold Fields
-

1 1 2 !d. The Commission also indicated that § 1 3(d) would continue to apply to bidders who
accumulated more than five percent of a class of equity securities registered with the SEC under § 1 2
o f the Exchange Act. Jd.
1 1 3 See supra note 35.
1 1 4 See Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 81, 750; Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, Consoli
dated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 87 1 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1 989) (noting that § 14(e) does not
contain a jurisdictional means requirement); Jacobs, supra note 68; cf Ruder Letter, supra note 54
("While Section 1 4(e) of the Exchange Act, and rules promulgated thereunder, apply to all tender
offers, whether or not the securities are registered under the Exchange Act, jurisdiction to enforce
those provisions, as well as the antifraud provisions generally, would not be available where, as here,
the shares are not registered and no other U.S. jurisdictional means appear to have been triggered.").
1 1 5 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 ( 1 989).
1 16 Minorco was incorporated in Luxembourg and owned primarily by two South African com
panies. Gold Fields, 87 1 F.2d at 255. It had no employees or property in the United States and had
never done business in the United States as of the time of the lawsuit. Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC v. Anglo American Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
1 1 7 Gold Fields had a partially owned American subsidiary, Newmont Mining Corp., which also
joined in the lawsuit. Gold Fields also had substantial holdings in the United States. Gold Fields,
87 1 F.2d at 255.
1 1 8 Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490.
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stock directly and indirectly through ADRs. 1 1 9
Minorco's tender offer was made in the United Kingdom and com
plied with all applicable U.K. laws. 1 2 0 Minorco sought to exclude U.S.
stockholders from the tender offer; it did not mail the offering documents
into the United States, and the offer stated that it was not being made in
the United States, directly or indirectly. 1 2 1 In addition, Minorco refused
to discuss the offer with the American press, labeled its initial press re
lease "Not for distribution in the USA" and refrained from any direct
communication with U.S. shareholders or ADR holders. 1 22
Immediately after Minorco announced its tender offer, Gold Fields
brought suit in the United States, claiming that the offer violated sections
l O(b) and 1 4(e) because it failed to disclose that Minorco was controlled
by South African interests. 1 23 Gold Fields sought a preliminary injunc
tion preventing the offer from going forward. 1 24
The district court applied the Second Circuit tests for extraterrito
rial application of the federal securities laws 1 25 and dismissed the securi
ties claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the district
court found that jurisdiction could be predicated upon one of two theo
ries. If Minorco had engaged in sufficient conduct in the United States
which related to the alleged fraud, jurisdiction could be predicated on
that conduct. 1 2 6 Alternatively, if Minorco's activities outside the United
1 19

Some 2.5% of Gold Fields' stock, representing approximately 5,300,000 shares, was held by
U.S. investors. Of this stock, about 50,000 shares were held directly by U.S. residents, another 3 . 1
million shares were held through trustees in the United Kingdom, and the remaining 2. 1 5 million
shares were held through ADRs. Gold Fields, 8 7 1 F.2d at 255. The Gold Fields ADRs were traded
in the U.S. over-the-counter market. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490.
1 20 William R. Covey, Comment, Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A.: The Extrater
ritorial Application of U.S. Securities Laws in International Equities Markets, 1 4 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 240, 256 n.84 ( 1990).
1 2 1 Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 256.
1 22 Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 495. Minorco did, however, make use of the services of U.S.
lawyers, investment bankers, and a public relations firm in connection with the offer. !d. at 494-95 .
1 2 3 Gold Fields, 87 1 F.2d a t 2 6 1 -63. Gold Fields also claimed that the offer violated U.S. antitrust
laws. !d. at 256-6 1 .
1 24 Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490.
1 25 The tests used by the court, the "conduct test" and the "effects test," had been developed in
litigation under § I O(b) and Rule !Ob-5. See infra notes 1 26-27. Gold Fields involved claims under
both § I O(b) and § 1 4(e). Although it is not clear that the plaintiffs had standing under § l O(b),
neither the district court nor the Second Circuit addressed that issue or considered whether the tests
previously used under § l O(b) were equally applicable to § 1 4(e).
1 2 6 Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 496. The conduct test was developed by the Second Circuit in
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1 326 (2d Cir. 1 972) and Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 5 1 9 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1 0 1 8 ( 1 975). It focuses on the
fraudulent activities engaged in by the defendants and premises jurisdiction upon the connection
between those activities and the United States. In Leasco, plaintiffs alleged securities fraud in con
nection with their purchase of stock in a British corporation, Pergamon Press, Ltd., on the London
Stock Exchange. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1 330-3 1 . Pergamon stock was not registered or listed in the
United States. See id. at 1 3 35. Leasco stands for the proposition that, where the defendant has
engaged in a sufficient degree of domestic conduct and where that conduct is related to the fraudu-
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States had substantial effects in the United States, jurisdiction was proper
under the effects test. 1 2 7
After reviewing the facts, the court found that although Minorco
had engaged in conduct in the United States, that conduct was at most
incidental to the alleged fraud: "Although Minorco's contacts here suf
fice for personal jurisdiction, there are no allegations that fraudulent
statements were made in the course of those contacts. " 1 28 The court
therefore found no subject matter jurisdiction under the conduct test.
The court then considered the effects test. It concluded that only a
small number of Americans held stock in Gold Fields and that Minorco
had taken reasonable steps to prevent the offering documents from being
sent into the United States. Accordingly, it held that "the mere fact that
an insignificant number of Americans hold stock in the defrauded
London company 1s not enough to support subject matter
jurisdiction." 1 2 9
The Second Circuit reversed, stating that the U.S. securities laws
apply to acts committed abroad if those acts have a substantial and fore
seeable effect in the United States. The court found that the tender offer
lent dealings, § l O(b) will apply to a transaction, even if the transaction is conducted abroad. /d. at
1 336.
In Bersch, the court clarified the conduct test by explaining that the quantity of conduct re
quired to trigger application of U.S. law depends on the victim's relationship with the United States.
Bersch, 5 1 9 F.2d at 992. Where the victim is a U.S. investor, the relationship between the domestic
conduct and the fraud may be less. Where the victim is a foreign citizen, the U.S. conduct must have
"directly caused" the loss. /d. at 992-93 . Some courts have distinguished, in applying the conduct
test, between conduct which is part of the fraud and conduct which is merely preparatory. See, e.g. ,
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1 987) ( jurisdiction under the conduct
test requires domestic conduct that "directly causes" the losses and is more than "merely prepara
tory"); see also liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 5 1 9 F.2d IO(Jl, 1 0 1 8 - 1 9 (2d Cir. 1 975) (remanding case for a
determination of the "wickedness" of the conduct performed in the United States). Cf SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 1 14 (3d Cir.) ( jurisdiction proper "where at least some activity designed to
further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country"), cert. denied, 43 1 U.S. 938 ( 1 977).
12 7 Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 496-97. The effects test, which was developed by the Second
Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 2 1 5
(2d Cir. 1 968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 ( 1 969), allows the federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign offers whenever a predominantly foreign transaction has substantial effects
in the United States. In Schoenbaum, the court explained that the provisions of the Exchange Act
should be applied extraterritorially "in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased
foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the
effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities. " 405 F.2d at 206. Accordingly, the
court found such domestic effects where the securities at issue were traded on a national exchange
and the challenged transaction adversely affected American investors. /d. at 208-09.
In Bersch, the court explained that the quality of the effect in the United States was important:
[T]here is subject matter jurisdiction of fraudulent acts relating to securities which are
committed abroad only when these result in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in
whom the United States has an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse effect on the
A merican economy or American investors generally.
5 1 9 F.2d at 989 (emphasis added).
128 Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 496.
1 2 9 /d. at 497.
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would have "substantial effects" in the United States, based on the fact
that British law required the ADR depository banks to forward the
tender offer to Gold Fields shareholders 1 30 in the United States and 2 . 5 %
o f the Gold Fields beneficial shareholders were U.S. residents. 1 3 1 I n ad
dition, the court found the quantity of stock owned by U.S. residents to
be significant. 1 3 2 It concluded therefore that jurisdiction was proper. 1 33
The Second Circuit distinguished the only other reported case to
consider the extraterritoriality of the Williams Act. 1 34 In Plessey Co.
PLC v. General Electric Co. PL C, 1 35 the District of Delaware refused to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction in a suit by Plessey, a British target
company, seeking to force General Electric, another British company, to
comply with the Williams Act in its offer for Plessey, 1 3 6 of which approx1 30 Gold Fields, 87 1 F.2d at 26 1 -62. Notably in the B.A.T. Industries offer, the terms of the offer
precluded those who received the offering documents from sending the documents into the United
States, regardless of their obligations under British law. Sending the offering documents by U.S.
mail would render the offer invalid. See Jacobs, supra note 68.
1 3 1 Gold Fields, 87 1 F.2d at 262.
1 32 Id. ("American residents representing 2.5% of Gold Fields' shareholders owned 5.3 million
shares with a market value of about $ 1 20 million."). The Second Circuit did not distinguish, as the
lower court had, between investors who held Gold Fields stock directly and those who held it indi
rectly through ADRs or nominee accounts. See 698 F. Supp. at 496 n.2 ("Plaintiffs' counsel con
ceded at oral argument that the number of Gold Fields shares owned directly by U. S. residents is
insignificant.") (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit's finding that the U.S. shareholdings were significant was based on its prior
decision in Bersch, in which it had upheld jurisdiction for a transaction involving sales of 42,936
shares to 22 American residents. 87 1 F.2d at 262. The statement in Gold Fields, that Bersch had
predicated jurisdiction under the effects test on ownership by 22 U.S. residents, is erroneous. The
court in Bersch, assumed that the defendants had mailed misleading prospectuses into the United
States and concluded that this mailing was sufficient conduct to subject defendants to jurisdiction on
the basis that it constituted conduct with a direct and foreseeable effect in the United States. See
Bersch, 5 1 9 F.2d at 99 1 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 18 ( 1965)).
1 3 3 Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262.
1 34 In a recent unreported decision issued from the bench, CDC Life Sciences, Inc. v. Institut
Merieux S.A., No. 88 Civ. 2761 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1 988) (hearing transcript of decision denying
preliminary injunction), the Southern District of New York refused to issue a preliminary injunction
preventing a French corporation from making a tender offer for the 3tock of a Canadian company.
Mann & Mari, supra note 8 1 , at *37. CDC, the target of the tender offer, had common stock which
was listed on the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges and quoted through NASDAQ. Id. Ap
proximately 1 5 % of the stock was held by U.S. investors. Merieux publicly announced its offer in
Canada and stated that it was open for acceptance on the floors of the Canadian exchanges. It did
not comply with the procedural or disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. Id. at * 3 8 .
Although Judge Sprizzo recognized the possibility that U . S . investors might tender their stock
in Canada and that the offer would thereby have an effect in the United States, he stated, "I am not
persuaded as a matter of law that the American securities laws can have extraterritorial effect in
Canada with respect to this foreign offer merely because shares are traded here and because an
American shareholder is not foreclosed from tendering his shares." Id. (quoting hearing transcript
of CDC Life Services, Inc. ).
1 35 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986).
1 36 Plessey claimed that General Electric made a tender offer in the United States when it an
nounced its imminent U.K. offer. The announcement was reported in the American press including
544

87:523 ( 1 993)

Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers

imately 1 . 6% was owned indirectly by U.S. investors. 1 37
General Electric had taken steps similar to those taken by Minorco
to exclude U.S. shareholders: it did not mail the offer into the United
States or announce it in the U.S. press; it specified that the offer was not
open to U.S. holders; and the offering documents indicated that shares
could not be tendered from the United States. 1 3 8 The court found that
General Electric had "steadfastly avoided American channels in its pur
suit of a foreign target" and that the U.S. interest in applying the Wil
liams Act was minimal. 1 39 It therefore refused to enjoin the offer to
require compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Act.
The Gold Fields court distinguished this decision on the ground that
the Plessey litigation was not based on allegations of fraud. The court
held that "the antifraud provisions of American securities laws have
broader extraterritorial reach than American filing requirements." 1 40
2.
The Restatement (Third) App roa ch The analysis by the Sec
ond Circuit in Gold Fields relied on a substantial body of case law ad
dressing the extraterritorial application of section l O(b) and Rule l Ob-5
and developing the conduct and effects tests. It also relied on the princi
ples articulated by the American Law Institute in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 141
In 1 986, the ALI revised the R estatement of Foreign Relations. 1 42 It
added to the general jurisdictional tests, which are similar to the conduct
-

the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Plessey, 628 F. Supp. at 480, 483. The offer was
also sent to Plessey's ADR holders by the depository, Citibank, pursuant to a contractual agreement
between Citibank, which was a sponsored ADR depository, and Plessey. See id. at 483.
137 /d. at 488. Plessey shares were held by Citibank as depository and traded in the United States
in the form of ADRs, which were registered with the SEC and traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. Approximately 1 . 2 million ADRs were outstanding in the United States at the time of
the offer. /d. at 479-83.
1 3 8 /d. at 480-86.
1 3 9 /d. at 495.
1 40 Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir.) (citing Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 5 1 9 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1 0 1 8 ( 1 975)), cert. dis
missed, 492 U.S. 939 ( 1 989).
141 The ALI has attempted to address the issue of federal securities jurisdiction in its various
Restatements of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Indeed, the conduct and effects tests
utilized by the Second Circuit are analogous to the two legal tests for prescriptive jurisdiction under
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Section 17 of the Restate
ment (Second) states that principles of international law allow a state to assert jurisdiction over
conduct occurring within its territory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1 7 ( 1 965). Section 18 allows a state to prescribe conduct occurring outside
its territory if the conduct causes a substantial and foreseeable effect within the territory. /d. § 1 8 .
A number o f opinions have used the principles o f the Restatement t o support their application of
U.S. law to primarily foreign transactions. See, e.g. , Bersch, 5 ! 9 F.2d at 985-89; AVC Nederland
B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 1 53 n.8 (2d Cir. 1 984) (citing cases).
142 For a description of the revisions to the R estatement, see Karl M. Meessen, Conflicts of Juris
diction Under the New Restatement, 50 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Summer 1 9 87).
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and effects tests, the requirement that the exercise of jurisdiction must be
reasonable. 1 43 The "reasonableness requirement" 1 44 provides that, even
where the exercise of jurisdiction is otherwise permissible, the courts
should decline to "exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a
person or activity having connections with another state when the exer
cise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." Section 403 of the R estatement
(Third) sets out the factors to be considered in determining whether the
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. The effect of the additional require
ment is to shift the emphasis from a determination of whether jurisdic
tion is permissible to whether it is proper.
The Restatement factors direct the court to conduct something like
an interest analysis in determining jurisdiction in cases of international
law. Courts are instructed to "consider various interests, examine con
tacts and links, give effect to justified expectations, search for the 'center
of gravity' of a given situation, and develop priorities. " 1 45 One reason
proffered for this change is the fact that other nations object to a broad
application of American law by our courts. Although a comprehensive
analysis of the new reasonableness requirement is beyond the scope of
this Article, 1 46 the focus on reasonableness begs the question of whether
an interest analysis is either practical or appropriate in the international
context. 1 47
IV.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH TO REGULATION

The application of the federal securities laws to foreign transactions
has been the subject of extensive commentary. 1 4 8 An analysis suggests
two possible questions: ( 1 ) whether the decisions are a permissible exer
cise of judicial power; and (2) even if the courts have the power to apply
domestic law to these transactions, whether the decisions are prudent.
Scholarly commentary has focused on the first question. Similarly,
courts have generally ended their inquiry with the first question, failing
1 43 The "reasonableness" test was designed to encourage restraint in the application of domestic
law. See id. at 54-60.
1 44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
( 1 986).
1 45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. IV, ch.
I, introductory note ( 1 987).

1 46 For a comprehensive evaluation of the reasonableness requirement, see David Michaels, Note,
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Transnational Securities Fraud: A Suggested Roadmap to the New
Standard of Reasonableness, 7 1 CORNELL L. REV. 9 1 9 ( 1 986); Barbara S. Thomas, Extraterritorial
ity in an Era of Internationalization of the Securities Markets: The Need to Revisit Domestic Policies,
35 RUTGERS L . REV. 453, 460-66 ( 1 983).
1 47 This issue will be considered in more detail below. See infra section IV.B.4; see also Note,
Extraterritorial Application of United States Law: the Case of Export Controls, 1 32 U. PA. L. REV.
355, 379 ( 1 984) (reasonableness test is "too amorphous and capable of being manipulated").
1 48 See supra note 7.
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to consider whether they should apply domestic law to the challenged
transactions, even if they possess the power to do so.
This Article will consider both questions. First, it will analyze the
reasoning in extraterritoriality decisions and conclude that courts are not
getting the law right. The issue in these cases is whether U.S. law should
be applied to a foreign tender offer. This is a choice-of-law question. By
framing the issue in terms of subject matter jurisdiction and applying a
"minimum contacts " analysis, courts are ignoring important factors.
The Article will go on to explore the relevant factors in a choice-of
law analysis. It will conclude that even if the courts 'Vere to analyze the
issues properly, the result would be bad policy. First, the courts have
misapprehended the effects of expansive U.S. regulation on both U.S. in
vestors and foreign sovereigns. Second, the choice-of-law analysis in this
area requires the courts to weigh competing foreign and domestic inter
ests in a way that strains judicial competence.
A.

The Power of the United States to Regulate Foreign Tender Offers

1.
The Judicial Approach-Subject Matter Jurisdiction. -The
starting point in an analysis of the existing law is whether the courts'
determination of power is proper. At the outset, this determination must
be measured by the presumption against applying domestic statutes ex
traterritorially. A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation re
quires courts to apply an ambiguous statute only to domestic conduct.
As the Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions, "legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 1 49 The assumption is
that Congress, absent any express provision to the contrary, is concerned
primarily with domestic conduct. 1 5 o
The Exchange Act does not expressly direct courts to apply its pro
visions extraterritorially. Most courts and commentators have described
the statute as silent on extraterritoriality. 1 5 1 There are also indications
that, at the time the federal securities laws were drafted, Congress was

1 49 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., I l l S. Ct. 1 227, 1 230 ( 1 99 1 ) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 2 8 1 , 285 ( 1 949)).
I SO The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that, when it so chooses, Congress knows how to
give extraterritorial effect to one of its statutes. See, e.g. , Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 ( 1 989). Accordingly, congressional silence is generally inter
preted as a decision against extraterritoriality. See A rabian Am. Oil, I l l S. Ct. at 1 230.
l S I See, e.g. , Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Exchange
Act is virtually silent on extraterritoriality, and legislative history is even more "barren"); Matson,
Note, supra note 7, at 1 48 ("Given the Exchange Act's silence on the question of extraterritoriality
. . . courts face a difficult dilemma."); Sachs, supra note 7, at 687 (Case law rests upon propositions
that Congress did not indicate whether the federal securities laws apply to foreign transactions and
that this silence was unintentional).
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primarily concerned with domestic markets. 1 5 2 Part of the impetus for
the federal securities laws was congressional concern with repairing the
damage to the economy caused by the United States stock market crash
in 1 929. The drafters hoped to institute a system to regulate and protect
domestic securities markets. 1 53 In particular, Congress focused on the
advantages of national regulation of the securities markets, as opposed to
the state-by-state regulation effected by the blue sky laws. 1 54 Through
the regulation of the securities markets, Congress intended to protect and
stabilize the domestic economy. 1 55
Accordingly, one can argue that the presumption against extraterri
toriality, coupled with an absence of clear evidence that Congress in
tended the federal securities laws to apply to primarily foreign
transactions, does not permit courts to apply American law in these
cases. 1 5 6 The courts have responded that Congress could not have been
expected, when the Exchange Act was drafted, to foresee the develop
ment of an international and largely interdependent market for securi
ties. 1 57 Thus, according to the Second Circuit and many commentators,
it is necessary for courts not simply to determine if jurisdiction is ex
pressly authorized, but to consider whether Congress would have author
ized such jurisdiction had it foreseen and considered the
internationalization of the markets. 1 5 8 The courts have acknowledged
that their interpretation is based on a wholly hypothetical legislative in
tent. Is the process therefore illegitimate? As Judge Bork observed in
1 5 2 See, e.g. , Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 1 33, 1 3 5 (9th Cir. 1 977) (Congress intended
to "protect the integrity of domestic securities markets in a particular stock.").
! 53 But see SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 1 09, 1 14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 43 1 U.S. 938 ( 1 977) ("The
securities acts expressly apply to 'foreign commerce,' thereby evincing a Congressional intent for a
broad jurisdictional scope for the 1933 and 1 934 Acts. ").
1 54 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b ( 1 990).
1 55 Professor Sachs argues that the prevailing reasoning which attributes to Congress a domestic
focus in the enactment of the federal securities laws is inaccurate. See Sachs, supra note 7. Professor
Sachs cites numerous places in the legislative history where Congress was both aware of and con
cerned about the increasing amount of trading by American investors in foreign securities. See id. at
684-708.
1 5 6 Congressional intent with respect to the extraterritorial application of § 1 4(e) is equally un
clear. See generally Conard, supra note 37. Professor Conard observes that the legislative history of
§ 1 4(e) supports two radically opposed hypotheses: ( 1 ) that Congress intended the section to have
the same applicability as other provisions in the statute; and (2) that Congress intended the section to
apply to virtually all tender offers everywhere.
1 57 See, e.g. , Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1 987) ("Fifty years
ago, Congress did not consider how far American courts should have jurisdiction to decide cases
involving predominantly foreign securities transactions with some link to the United States.");
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 5 1 9 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1 0 1 8 ( 1 975) (The
Congress that passed the federal securities laws "in the midst of the depression could hardly have
been expected to foresee the development of offshore funds thirty years later. ").
! 5 8 Faced with a lack of evidence as to congressional intent but a concern that the general con
gressional purpose of protecting domestic investors and markets be effected, the courts, led by the
Second Circuit, have decided to assert jurisdiction under § I O(b) based on their "best judgment as to
what Congress would have wished if these problems had occurred to it." Bersch, 5 1 9 F.2d at 993.
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Zoelsch , "It is somewhat odd to say, as Bersch and some other opinions
do, that courts must determine their jurisdiction by divining what 'Con
gress would have wished' if it had addressed the problem. " 1 59 Even if
judges believe that Congress would have crafted the statute to apply to
international securities transactions, they lack the power, through a dis
play of judicial activism, to edit the statute from chambers.
But it is not clear that this is an accurate description of the decisions
on extraterritoriality. The decisions and resulting commentary appear to
skip a crucial step: consideration of whether application of U.S. law to
the transactions at issue is really extraterritorial application of the law.
This raises a more fundamental issue: what do we mean by extraterritori
ality? Is it an extraterritorial (and perhaps objectionable) application of
U.S. law to apply the federal securities laws to transactions such as those
in Bersch 160 and Leasco 1 6 1 ? Are the courts applying U.S. law to some
thing other than a domestic securities transaction?
It is helpful to recognize that a decision by the court to apply the
federal securities laws to a transaction with foreign elements implicitly
involves two issues. First, the court must fi n d that the transaction has
sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to justify the exercise
of adjudicative jurisdiction by a U.S. court. 1 62 Second, having assumed
control of the case, the court must decide to apply U.S. law. This second
decision involves the application of choice-of-law rules. An analytical
difficulty arises because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
In these cases, jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal question,
the application of the federal securities laws. Therefore, if the court is to
retain jurisdiction, it must do so on the basis that it is applying federal
law to the transaction. 1 6 3 Thus a finding of subject matter jurisdiction is
premised on two different thresholds: minimum contacts sufficient to
render exercise of jurisdiction proper; and a sufficient basis for applica
tion of U.S. law.
The courts in cases like Leasco and Bersch deal with the first thresh
old explicitly. 1 64 They fail to acknowledge, however, that their exercise
1 59
1 60

Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32.
In Bersch, stock was sold by a Canadian corporation in an international public offering to
citizens of many countries, including some Americans. The stock was not listed, registered or di
rectly marketed in the United States. 5 1 9 F.2d at 978-80, 983-85.
1 6 1 Leasco involved the purchase, by U.S. citizens, of stock in a British corporation. The
purchase was made through British brokers on the London Stock Exchange. The stock was not
registered in the United States and not traded on U.S. exchanges. 468 F.2d at 1 330, 1 332.
162 The court must also conclude that each party has sufficient ties with the United States to
permit the imposition of personal jurisdiction.
163 See Brilmayer, supra note 10, at 13. When the federal court's jurisdiction is premised upon
the application of the federal securities laws, a finding by the court that those laws do not apply will
destroy the federal question basis for subject matter jurisdiction and, in the absence of a pending
federal question, the federal court must dismiss the case.
164 See Bersch , 5 1 9 F.2d at 985 (activities in U.S. sufficient to authorize jurisdiction); Leasco, 468
F.2d at 1 334-35 (conduct within U.S. sufficient from standpoint of jurisdiction).

549

N O R T HW E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L AW R E V I EW

of jurisdiction involves a choice-of-law question. Unlike many areas in
volving conflicts of law or the potential application of the laws of more
than one sovereign, courts in federal securities cases do not consciously
employ a choice-of-law analysis.
In reality, these cases are not about whether the transactions have
sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to permit the applica
tion of U.S. law. Although the courts claim to be applying U.S. law to
foreign transactions, which is presumably what we mean by extraterrito
riality, the unarticulated choice-of-law analysis locates the U.S. elements
and interests in the transaction, thereby recharacterizing the transaction
as international rather than foreign. 1 6 5 Once this transformation has oc
curred, the application of U.S. law is no more extraterritorial than the
application of Minnesota law to a Wisconsin automobile accident. 1 66
Moreover, an examination of the courts' reasoning demonstrates that
these cases do not involve the application of U.S. law to foreign securities
fraud, but rather a judicial determination that the fraud to which U.S.
law is being applied is located in the United States. 16 7
Accordingly, the cases do not implicate the courts' power under
principles of subject matter jurisdiction at all. Application of U.S. law to
a transaction that may be characterized as domestic is not an extraterri
torial application of the law, and does not encroach upon the congres
sional prerogative to determine the scope of such application. The courts
clearly have the power to apply U.S. law and if their analysis complies
with the limitations on a forum court's authority to apply forum law,
they should do so.
2. Recasting the Judicial Approach as Choice-of-Law.-An exami
nation of the Second Circuit "extraterritoriality" cases demonstrates that
the court's analysis is nearly identical to the traditional territorial ap
proach to choice-of-law. The territorial approach viewed application of a
sovereign's law as constrained by the territorial limits of the sovereign.
A court could therefore apply a state's law to transactions occurring

16 5 The Second Circuit performed this analysis explicitly in A ljadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 1 1 2 S. Ct. 638 ( 1 99 1 ), a recent case involving the extraterritorial application of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 1 5 U.S.C. § 1 962(a)-(d) ( 1 988) ("RICO").
Although the court claimed that its analysis of legislative history justified the extraterritorial applica
tion of RICO, it concluded that subject matter jurisdiction was proper on the basis that the allegedly
fraudulent securities sales were "predicate acts which occurred primarily in the United States, and
hence, serve as a basis of subject matter jurisdiction for the RICO claims." A lfadda, 935 F.2d at
480. Thus, the court was essentially locating the transactions, for purposes of RICO, in the United
States.
166
1 67

See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 ( 1 9 8 1 ).
Indeed, the Leasco court came close to acknowledging this rationale for its analysis when it
analogized to the choice-of-law rules under the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws and concluded
that the rules for determining the location of a tort have become more sophisticated. See Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1 326, 1 337 (2d Cir. 1 972).
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within that state. 1 68 This choice-of-law rule was known as lex loci
delicti. Under this approach, which was adopted by the First R estate
ment of Conflict of Laws, the law governing a tort claim was the law of
the state in which the tort occurred. 169
Of course, in order to apply this principle, the court had to deter
mine the location of the tort. This location was not determined by the
nationality of the tortfeasor or the victim, but by a set of legal tests which
varied from state to state. 1 7 ° For example, most courts applying the lex
loci delicti approach determined that the tort "occurred" at the location
where its effects were felt, that is, where the plaintiff suffered injury. 1 7 1
Other courts, particularly i n actions based on intentional misrepresenta
tions, concluded that the place of the tort was the place of the wrongful
conduct, that is, at the place where the misrepresentation was made. 1 7 2
Modern choice-of-law rules have moved beyond the "location of the
tort" analysis. Nonetheless, we can see within this early approach the
seeds of the Second Circuit's jurisdictional tests under the federal securi
ties laws. For example, the courts' conduct test can be viewed as deter
mining the location of the tortious conduct. Someone who engages in
fraudulent conduct in the United States has committed a fraud within
the United States. If the fraud occurs within the United States, applica
tion of domestic law to the transaction is not extraterritorial application
of the securities laws.
Similarly, the effects test is merely an extension of the legal rule that
a tort is located at the place where the injury occurs. The "effects" of the
securities fraud in the United States upon which courts have predicated
U.S. jurisdiction are injuries to U.S. investors and U.S. markets. Thus a
misrepresentation which, although made abroad, injures investors and
168 See, e.g. , American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 2 1 3 U.S. 347, 3 56-57 ( 1 909) (sovereign
power to regulate limited to that sovereign's ·territorial limits).
1 69 State law torts such as tortious or fraudulent misrepresentation are most closely analogous to
federal securities fraud. Accordingly, this Article analyzes the courts' choice-of-law analysis by
comparison to choice-of-law principles applicable to torts.
170 The First Reslatement leaves open the issue of whether the location of the wrong in a tort case
is the place where the wrongful conduct occurs or the place of the injury. See, e.g. , Joseph W.
Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. I , 9 n.22 ( 1 989).
1 7 1 See, e.g. , Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, I I So. 803 (Ala. 1 892) (the law of the
state of the injury, not the state of the negligent conduct, governs a tort action); Eby v. York Divi
sion, Borg-Warner, 455 N.E.2.d 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (under Indiana law, torts of fraud and
misrepresentation occurred where the loss occurred). This was the majority position under the First
Restatement. See Willis L.M. Reese, Conflicts of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 J.L. & CoN
TEMP. PROBS. 679, 699 (1 963) ("Until recently, the courts with rare unanimity applied the law of the
place of the injury to determine rights and liabilities in tort.").
1 72 See, e.g. , Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 560 F. Supp. 9 1 6, 9 1 8 (D. Del. 1 983)
("In the case of intentional torts, the courts have preferred to apply the law of the defendant's place
of conduct rather than the place of injury.") (citing Marra v. Bushee, 477 F.2d 1 282, 1283 (2d Cir.
1971)).
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markets within the United States, is also located within the United
States.
This puts the courts' analysis in the above-described cases in a new
light. The courts are not applying the securities laws extraterritorially,
but simply using traditional choice-of-law rules to conclude that a de
fendant who makes misrepresentations or omissions in the context of an
international transaction can be deemed to have committed a fraud
within the United States, thereby subjecting him to the coverage of the
federal securities laws. Whether the courts have chosen the correct
choice-of-law rules and applied those rules properly is a matter that may
be debated, but the courts are not engaging in judicial lawmaking or
broadening the scope of the securities laws beyond that authorized by
Congress.
Moreover, once the courts' actions are properly described as charac
terizing the fraud as domestic and applying choice-of-law principles, they
become virtually immune from attack as beyond the courts' authority. 1 7 3
Even in the domestic context, there are few constraints upon a forum
state's decision to apply its own law to a transaction. 1 74 The U.S. Consti
tution serves as an outer limit on this decision; the application of local
law to a transaction in which the state has no interest may violate the due
process or equal protection rights of the parties. 1 75
In the international context, however, even this minimal constraint
is abandoned. Courts have not used the Constitution to limit the applica
tion of U.S. law to predominantly foreign transactions. 1 7 6 Instead of
viewing the issue in terms of whether the United States has sufficient
contacts with the transaction to render the application of domestic law
jurisdiction constitutional, the courts have focused on ascertaining con1 7 3 As Professor Kramer has observed, choice-of-law is not subject to some "overarching theory
of justice [which] defines objectively 'correct' answers to conflict cases. [Rather,] true conflicts are
difficult precisely because there is no general theory against which to measure the justice of the
conflicting laws of different states." Larry Kramer, R ethinking Choice-of-law, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 280 ( 1990).
1 74 See Robert A. Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1 080, 1084 ( 1 98 1 )
("[A] forum court may employ any reasonable basis for choice that pleases it, and several bases are
available. Courts need not distinguish clearly between them, may combine them in some eclectic
fashion, or misapply them, if the adequate contact exists."); see also RoGER C. CRAMTON ET AL.,
CoNFLICT OF LAws 58- 1 3 5 (4th ed. 1 987) (citing absence of limits on a court's ability to manipulate
the location of the tort under traditional choice-of-law rules to justify the application of a preferred
law); Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARY. L. REV. 1484, 1 626
( 1 9 9 1 ) (same).
1 75 "[I]f a state has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or transac
tion, application of its law is unconstitutional." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 3 10- 1 1
( 1 9 8 1). See Robert A. Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice-of-law, 28 J . L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 706, 706- 14 ( 1 963).
1 7 6 Professor Brilmayer has asserted that the constitutional limitations on application of local law
that have been used in the domestic context are similarly applicable in the international area. See
Brilmayer, supra note 10, at 3 1 .
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gressional intent and, once the predicate intent to apply the statute has
been established, applied domestic law on the basis of the minimum con
tacts necessary for jurisdiction. 1 77 In the absence of any constitutional or
other legal constraint on the choice-of-law decision in the international
context, the application of the federal securities laws under the conduct
and effects tests appears to be a legitimate exercise of the courts' power.
B.

The Propriety of Applying U.S. Law to Foreign Tender Offers

Recasting the analysis in terms of choice-of-law makes it difficult to
attack decisions such as that in Gold Fields as beyond the court's power.
But are decisions applying U.S. law to foreign tender offers correct? To
be more precise, if the question is one of choice-of-law, have the courts
properly analyzed the choice-of-law issue? By terming the issue jurisdic
tional, the courts have tended to analyze the sufficiency of contacts, and
to find it equitable to apply U.S. law to predominantly foreign transac
tions 1 7 8 based on a minimal level of such contacts. 1 79 This approach has
ignored several important choice-of-law factors.
By contrast, choice-of-law analysis recognizes that a number of
countries may have sufficient contacts with the transaction to permit the
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. Even if this threshold is met,
however, the forum court must still choose a single law to provide each
rule of decision. The choice-of-law decision requires the court to do
more than count a minimum quantity of contacts; it must further investi
gate the quality of the contacts. This forces the court to consider the
legitimate interests and expectations of both the parties to the dispute
and the sovereigns whose law might be applied. In domestic choice-of
law cases, it is commonplace for a state to possess the power to act as the
forum for the dispute-if the state possesses the minimal contacts neces
sary for jurisdiction 1 80-yet be obliged to apply some other state's sub1 77 Accordingly, the courts never address the question of whether there are constitutional (or
other) limits, even under a statute which unambiguously applies extraterritorially to the application
of U.S. law to foreign transactions. For a critical examination of this issue, see Brilmayer & Norchi,
supra note 1 0.
1 7 8 As the foregoing analysis indicates, there is no greater theoretical limitation on courts' power
to apply domestic law to transactions that are exclusively foreign in nature. In the absence of ex
plicit statutory direction, however, it is unlikely that the courts would choose to go so far, even in the
name of investor protection.
1 79 The Leasco court adopted this approach explicitly, giving short shrift to defendants' argument
that choice-of-law principles required application of English law: " [A]s we have already demon
strated . . . the nation where the conduct has occurred has jurisdiction to displace foreign law and to
direct its courts to apply its own." Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1 326,
1 3 39 (2d Cir. 1972).
1 80 Generally, a state need only have sufficient contacts with the parties to render its exercise of
jurisdiction consistent with the constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction. See International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 3 1 0 ( 1 945). There are a few areas in which states have traditionally
been limited with respect to subject matter jurisdiction-most commonly cases involving the adjudi
cation of title to land located outside the state and divorce proceedings by nondomiciliaries or non553
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stantive law-if those contacts do not arise to the higher level necessary
under choice-of-law rules. 1 8 1
Moreover, even i n the domestic context, choice-of-law analysis
grants courts considerable latitude to decide whether it is in the best in
terest of public policy to apply forum law. In both domestic and interna
tional cases, the court must interpret the policy behind application of the
competing laws. In the international context, the decision also involves
issues of comity ; the court must consider the political impact of applying
U.S. law on international relations, U.S. foreign policy, and the develop
ment of multinational business.
Whether the application of U.S. law is correct therefore depends
upon a number of factors. 1 82 It is clear that courts are ignoring these
factors. A conflicts-type analysis reveals that courts have not even ap
plied the correct test. Although territorial notions were the original basis
for determining which law to apply to a transaction, modern choice-of
law theory has moved away from that approach. At least in the context
of choosing between the laws of different U.S. states, courts have moved
from territorialism to more modern methods. 1 8 3
residents. See, e.g. , Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 1 5 8 ( 1 8 1 0) (no jurisdiction of
Kentucky over "naked question of title" to land outside the state); Winston v. Winston, 1 6 1 So.2d
588 (Ala. 1 964) (divorce decree void for want of subject matter jurisdiction where both parties were
nonresidents of forum state); Stewart v. Stewart, 698 S.W.2d 5 1 6 (Ark. Ct. App. 1 985) (subject
matter jurisdiction of Kansas court over divorce requires domiciliary status); Holt v. Guerguin, 1 63
S.W. 10, 1 2 (Tex. 1 9 1 4) (state cannot adjudicate title to land located in another state).
1 8 1 This is something of an oversimplification. One of the most common criticisms of Currie's
interest analysis is that it permits a state to manipulate the interests involved to permit application of
its own law to virtually any dispute. See supra note 1 74 and accompanying text.
1 82 At the forefront of commentators' objections to broad principles of extraterritoriality is the
recognition that the judicial resources of the United States are limited. See, e.g. , Stephen Boat
wright, Note, Reversing the Expansive Trend of Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Bad
Conduct Under Rule JOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934, 23 TEX. INT'L LJ. 487, 500
( 1 988). A decision to apply federal law represents a choice to expend those limited resources on a
class of problems that a foreign country may be better equipped to handle. The Bersch court ques
tioned "whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law
enforcement agencies to be devoted to [transnational transactions] rather than leave the problem to
foreign countries." Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 5 1 9 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1 0 1 8 ( 1 975). Although this Article will not discuss the interest of the United States in conserv
ing its scarce judicial resources, it is clear that federal docket congestion is an increasing problem
and that the limitations of the federal judicial system and the effect of overcrowding on the availabil
ity of justice militate against an expansive view of the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. In addition, to the extent that the securities laws are interpreted to permit private rights of
action by foreigners, the American judicial system (and American taxpayers) are subsidizing the
resolution of essentially foreign disputes.
1 8 3 See Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1 326, 1 33 7 (2d Cir. 1 972)
("In the somewhat different yet closely related context of choice-of-law, the mechanical test that, in
determining the locus delicti, 'The place of the wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place,' . . . has given way, in the case of fraud and
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The Validity of Territorialism. -The primary replacement for
territorialism is interest analysis. Interest analysis was developed by
Brainerd Currie in the late 1 9 50s and early 1 960s and requires the court
to determine which state has the primary interest in applying its law to
the transaction. 1 84 Professor Currie's work was influential in the devel
opment of the R estatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 1 85 The Second
R estatement rejects the somewhat rigid choice-of-law rules of the First
R estatement in favor of flexible standards, namely "applying the law of
the state with the most significant relationship to the parties and the
transaction or occurrence." 1 86 This approach, termed the "most signifi
cant relationship" test, 1 8 7 requires courts to consider a number of factors
to determine which sovereign has the most significant relationship to a
transaction. 1 88
Replacement of the lex loci de1icti approach was motivated in part
by a perception that the territorial approach of the First R estatement was
too inflexible. 1 8 9 The application of interest analysis or the Second Re
statemen t approach allows the court to consider a variety of factors in
determining which state is more appropriately concerned with regulating
1.

misrepresentation, to a more extensive and sophisticated analysis. ") (citing RESTATEMENT (S Ec 
OND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 48 ( 1 97 1)).
As of 1 989, however, some fourteen states have retained the territorial approach of the First
Restatement and expressly rejected interest analysis or its equivalent. See Michael E. Solime, A n
Economic and Empirical A nalysis of Choice-of-law, 2 4 G A . L . REV. 49, 5 4 n . 3 3 ( 1 9 89).
1 8 4 See Leflar, supra note 1 74, at 1 080-87.
1 8 5 See, e.g. , BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ( 1 963); Robert
A. Leflar; Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 ( 1 966).
1 86 Singer, supra note 1 70, at 7.
1 8 7 Id. at 2 1 .
1 8 8 The Restatement includes specific factors to be considered in a misrepresentation case as well
as general factors to be considered in any choice-of-law analysis. The specific factors include:
(a) the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the defendant's represen
tations, (b) the place where the plaintiff received the representations, (c) the place where the
defendant made the representations, (d) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorpora
tion and place of business of the parties, (e) the place where a tangible thing which is the subject
of the transaction between the parties was situated at the time, and (f) the place where the
plaintiff is to render performance under a contract which he has been induced to enter by the
false representations of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 48 ( 1 97 1 ). The general factors include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the
forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interest of those states
in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the
basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity
of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6.
1 89 See, e.g. , In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (describing Ohio's
decision "to abandon strict adherence to the traditional rule of lex loci delicti in favor of a more
flexible rule based on which state has 'a more significant relationship to the lawsuit.' ") (citing Mor
gan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ohio 1 984), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1 006 ( 1 989); In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 6 1 3 n.21 (7th Cir.) (describing Second Restatement
approach as designed to "supplant" lex loci delicti rule which was "wooden and mechanical"), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 878 (198 1).
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the subject transaction. The development of the Second R estatement to
gether with reexamination of confhcts standards by both scholars and
courts has led to a general acceptance of the principles of interest
analysis. 1 90
Although interest analysis in one form or another commands the
greatest degree of accord among courts, some recent scholars have criti
cized this approach, claiming that it suffers from many of the flaws of the
traditional territorial approach. 19 1 Such scholars argue that conflict-of
laws analysis should reflect a greater recognition of the rights created by
legislation; it is these rights that should determine which state's law is
applied. 1 92 Whether the inquiry is framed in terms of interests or rights,
however, it is clear that a simple adherence to territorial principles is
inappropriate; modern choice-of-law theory requires a more thorough ex
amination of the issues than that developed by the Second Circuit.
2.
Interest Analysis: US. Interests in Regulation. -Contemporary
choice-of-law principles suggest that the decision to apply U.S. law to
foreign tender offers should be examined under the principles of interest
analysis, rather than under the outdated territorialist approach. Under
this approach, the courts must evaluate the interests of the United States
in applying the Williams Act to foreign tender offers. 1 93 Against this

1 9 0 See, e.g. , Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 306-07 ( 1 98 1 ) (upholding Minnesota
Supreme Court's use of interest analysis); Judge v. American Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1 5 65, 1 567-68
( 1 1 th Cir. 1 990) (applying interest analysis as replacement for rule of lex loci delicti); Barnes Group,
Inc. v. C & C Prod., Inc., 7 1 6 F.2d 1 023, 1032-33 (4th Cir. 1 983) (finding Ohio had abandoned lex
loci delicti in favor of "the contemporary approach based upon interest analysis").
1 9 1 See Solime, supra note 1 83 , at 5 1 -58 (discussing judicial and academic criticisms of interest
analysis). Scholars claim that both interest analysis and territorialism are difficult to apply, produce
unpredictable results, and raise constitutional problems. See, e.g. , Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis
and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. RE V. 392 ( 1 980); John B. Corr, Interest A nalysis and
Choice-of-law: The Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1983 UTA H L. R EV. 65 1 ; Maurice Rosenberg,
The Comeback a/ Choice-of-Law Rules, 8 1 COLUM. L. REV 946 ( 1 9 8 1 ).
1 9 2 See, e.g. , Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. R Ev.
293, 297-98 ( 1 987); Lea Brilmayer, R ights, Fairness, and Choice-of-law, 98 YALE L.J. 1 277 ( 1 989);
Perry Dane, Vested Rights, " Vestedness, " and Choice-of-law, 96 YALE L.J. 1 19 1 ( 1 987).
.

1 93 The reader will observe that this brings the analysis back to the issue of congressional intent.
Although the correct analysis focuses on the legislative policies behind the federal securities laws
rather than on whether Congress in 1 934 intended to regulate a foreign tender offer, an evaluation of
the U.S. interest in regulation includes an inquiry into congressional intent. The following discus
sion demonstrates that courts may be better able to analyze legislative purpose and policy under a
choice-of-law approach; the discussion does not purport to be an exhaustive list of the relevant
factors to be considered in such an analysis. Moreover, it is not clear that this analysis is properly
conducted by the courts. See infra section IV.B.4. Accordingly, this section will highlight a number
of the factors relevant to a judicial choice-of-law analysis but will conclude that the legitimacy and
adequacy of such a judicial inquiry is constrained by the limited judicial role in policy-making, in
general, and foreign policy, in particular. The Article will therefore propose that the choice-of-law
issue in foreign tender offers be addressed by Congress directly, based on the policies discussed in
this section.
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interest, the courts must weigh the interests of other sovereigns in regu
lating the transactions.
What are the U.S. interests implicated by application of the federal
securities laws? 1 94 The legislative history indicates that the primary pur
pose of the federal securities laws was investor protection. 1 9 5 This pro
tection was to be achieved through a disclosure-oriented system of
regulation. 196 In particular, at the time of the 1 929 stock market crash
and the subsequent Great Depression, many U.S. investors had sustained
losses through the purchase of worthless and fraudulent securities that
were marketed into the United States from abroad. 1 97
Accordingly, the courts must consider whether the application of
U.S. law to foreign tender offers protects the interests of U.S. securi
tyholders. The recent SEC releases demonstrate the tension between the
1 94 This analysis might include an examination of U.S. interests in regulation of foreign tender
offers in general as well as the determination whether, on a case-by-case basis, regulation of a partic
ular offer is warranted. It is the intention of this Article, through examination of these interests, to
posit a general approach. The existing policy of examining transactions on a post hoc individual
basis defeats both the objectives of predictability and cost minimization and the incentive for foreign
bidders to open transactions to U.S. investors in predominantly foreign transactions without fear of
subjecting themselves to U.S. regulation.
1 95 Congress was also concerned about protection of the U.S. securities markets. This concern
included a recognition that the securities markets reflect investment value and thereby affect the flow
of capital, as well as a concern about the impact that instabilities and crises in the securities markets
have upon the economy as a whole. See 1 5 U.S.C. § 78b (Supp. 1 990) (describing necessity for
regulation as including impact of fluctuations in securities prices on commerce and recognizing that
fluctuations and speculation in the securities markets have the effect of precipitating, intensifying,
and prolonging national emergencies).
196 The Supreme Court has identified disclosure as the fundamental purpose behind the Exchange
Act. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 ( 1 977) (describing "fundamental purpose"
of Securities Exchange Act as "implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure' " ) . See Steve The!,
The Original Conception of Section JO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 3 85, 390
( 1 990); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 3 32, 336 ( 1967) (central purpose of Exchange Act is
"to protect investors through the requirement offull disclosure by issuers of securities") (emphasis
added); Senate Report on Securities Exchange Act Amendments, S. REP. No. 1 036, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. ( 1 9 54) (essential purpose of the basic federal securities laws was "full disclosure and the protec
tion of the investing public"). In describing the application of the proposed tender offer regulations
of the Williams Act, then-SEC Chairman Manfred Cohen analyzed the regulations to the preexisting
registration provisions for initial public offerings. Chairman Cohen explained that the cash tender
offer presented the shareholder with a decision as to whether to disinvest, and that it was appropriate
to require the analogous disclosure to that associated with a decision to invest. See Manfred Cohen,
Address on Proposed Legislation To Regulate Tender Offers Before American Society of Corporate
Secretaries, Inc. (June 28, 1 966), in VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 850 (3d ed. 1 987).
1 9 7 See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1 933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AcT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 1 7 , at 2 (camp. by J.S.
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar 1 973); Sachs, supra note 7, at 691 -99 (describing substantial losses by
U.S. investors holding foreign securities and congressional recognition of those losses during debate
on federal securities laws). Professor Sachs has concluded from this historical background that Con
gress drafted the acts to protect those who trade in domestic markets, regardless of whether the
securities stem from a domestic or foreign issuer. See Sachs, supra note 7, at 694-708.
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courts' view of investor protection and the reality of the international
securities markets. 198 An increasing number of investors are choosing to
participate in those markets and to forsake the certain protection of U.S.
law in favor of the opportunity to diversify more broadly and participate
in economic development abroad. 1 9 9 These investors search out foreign
markets with different levels of regulation for the different investment
opportunities that those markets offer.
Although it may appear that the application of the tender offer regu
lations of the Williams Act clearly offer enhanced protection to share
holders, as discussed above, if the application of U.S. law causes foreign
bidders to close their offers to U.S. investors, the ultimate effect may be
both a decrease in the information available to U.S. investors and a loss
of the ability to participate in the tender offer directly. 2 00 The bidder
risks the application of U.S. law if it so much as announces the offer in
the United States and explains to investors how to tender. 201
The current SEC proposals do not alleviate this problem. The pro
posals do not address the primary concern of foreign bidders with U.S.
involvement: the risk that making the offer in the United States will sub
ject them to litigation under the federal securities laws, particularly liti
gation under the antifraud provisions. 202 Thus the SEC proposals are
1 98

As the Commission observed:
[The] Concept Release posed the fundamental question of whether U.S. investors' interests
would be better served by insisting upon compliance with U.S. regulations for all offers ex
tended into this country, resulting in the continued exclusion of U.S. securityholders from
tender and exchange offers, or facilitating the participation of U.S. investors on equal terms
with foreign securityholders . . . .
Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, at 8 1 ,744. In response to this question, commentators over
whelmingly endorsed the view that protection of investors would be furthered by a system which
facilitated their inclusion in the offers.
1 99 Courts have recognized this choice. See, e.g. , MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d
170, 175 (5th Cir. 1 990) ("Having gone to such lengths to structure a transaction not burdened by
the securities laws, plaintiffs cannot expect to wrap themselves in their protective mantle when the
deal sours.").
200 See supra notes 54-6 1 and accompanying text.
20 1 This frustrates the purpose of the Williams Act-to provide investor protection through infor
mation. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. I ( 1 985) (primary purpose of Williams
Act is disclosure). Senator Williams, sponsor of the bill in the Senate, articulated the rationale for
legislation as follows:
Today, the public shareholder in deciding whether to accept or reject a tender offer possesses
limited information. No matter what he does, he acts without adequate knowledge to enable
him to decide rationally what is the best course of action. This is precisely the dilemma which
our securities laws are designed to prevent.
Id. at 8-9 (quoting 1 1 3 CONG. REc. 24,664 ( 1 967) (remarks of Sen. Williams)).
202 See, e.g. , Letter from Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Attorneys at Law, to Securities and Ex
change Commission (Nov. 2 1 , 1 99 1) (on file with author) (In response to Tender Offer Release,
supra note 2, Pepper, Hamilton stated that U. K. lawyers and bankers view risk of U.S. litigation as
the "most significant deterrent" against including U.S. shareholders in a tender offer.); Letter from
Securities Industry Association to Jonathan G. Katz, Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept.
I I , 1992) [hereinafter "Securities Industry Association Letter"] (on file with author) (In response to
Tender Offer Release, supra note 2, the Association stated that it "believe[s] the imposition of U.S.
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unlikely to persuade foreign bidders not to lock U.S. investors out of
their offers. 20 3
One might argue that Congress, in applying the Williams Act to
these transactions, has made a policy decision in favor of broad regula
tion at the expense of some tender offer opportunities for those who in
vest abroad. One problem with this argument is that there is scant
evidence in the statute of such a decision. A second problem is that the
legislative history of the Williams Act indicates a focus not on the ab
stract notion of investor protection, but on protection of investor
choice. 204 Indeed, both the Senate Report accompanying S. 5 1 0 and
statements by supporters of the legislation indicate a desire to preserve
the opportunity for investors to participate in tender offers. 20 5 Finally,
the SEC itself has proposed for comment the advisability of permitting
corporations and their shareholders to waive the protections of the Wil
liams Act, recognizing that some investors may not need the protections
or desire the costs associated with the regulations. 2°6
The courts may also be concerned with whether refusing to apply
the Williams Act will defeat the legitimate expectations of investors. 207
Is it reasonable for U.S. residents who purchase securities in predomi
nantly foreign transactions to expect that U.S. law will apply? If the
civil liability is generally recognized to be the single greatest obstacle to foreign bidders who might
otherwise wish to include U.S. shareholders in their offers of foreign securities."); see also Morton A.
Pierce, SEC Looks At Multinationals: Encouraging International Offers to U.S. Security Holders,
N.Y. LJ., Sept. 1 0, 1 990, at 5, 7 (Because of perception of United States as a litigious society, foreign
bidders may be reluctant to rely on exclusion from U.S. tender offer rules if antifraud provisions still
apply to their bid.).
203 See ABA Letter, supra note 1 10 (suggesting that application of antifraud provisions to foreign
offers will remain an obstacle to use of the SEC's approach by foreign bidders and advocating a safe
harbor approach with respect to application of the U.S. antifraud provisions); Letter from R.A.G.
Miller, Heading of Listing Secretariat, London Stock Exchange, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 6, 1 99 1 ) (on file with author) (In response to Tender
Offer Release, supra note 2, Miller stated that "if the aims of the release are to be realised, the threat
of litigation arising as a result of extending offers to United States holders will have to be reduced. ").
204 See, e.g. , Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1 538, 1 545- 47
(S.D.N.Y.) (discussing development of Williams Act into a vehicle for protecting investor choice),
rev 'd, 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1 983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1 052 ( 1 9 84).
20 5 See, e.g. , S. REP. No. 550, supra note 1 6, at 3 (protections designed to allow reasoned invest
ment decisions by shareholders); 1 1 3 CONG. REc. 854 (daily ed. Jan. 1 8, 1 967) (statement of Sen .
. Williams) (bill would protect shareholders "without impeding cash takeover bids"); 1 1 3 CONG. REc.
24,666 (daily ed. Aug. 30, 1 967) (statement of Sen. Javitz) (bill would allow shareholders to benefit
from "the opportunities which result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock of a given
company").
206 See Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Exchange Act Re
lease No. 23,486, [ 1 986- 1 987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) � 84, 1 08, at 88,207 (July 3 1 ,
1986) ("self-governance" exemption).
207 See, e.g. , Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 47 1 U.S. 68 1 , 694-96 ( 1 984); United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 42 1 U.S. 837, 8 5 1 ( 1 975); Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 333-34
(3d Cir.), aff'd sub nom. , Gould v. Ruefenacht, 47 1 U.S. 701 ( 1 9 84) (recognizing importance of
legitimate expectations of investors in determining scope of federal securities laws coverage).
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securities are listed on a U.S. exchange or registered with the SEC, the
answer is probably yes. In addition to protecting investors, the United
States has an interest in regulating the U.S. securities markets. However,
it is not clear that this interest extends to transactions that occur outside
of those markets. One may conclude that investors who choose to bypass
the domestic exchanges by purchasing stock that is not offered or traded
directly in the United States have waived the protection of the U.S.
system.
The interest of the United States may also depend on the type of
claim for which jurisdiction is sought. The Gold Fields court, for exam
ple, concluded that the U.S. has a stronger interest in applying its an
tifraud provisions than its disclosure requirements. 208 The R estatement
of Foreign Relations takes the same position. 209 The problem is that
fraud in the context of sections l O(b) and 1 4(e) is not the equivalent of
common law fraud, but is based on a complex jurisprudence of disclosure
obligations and duties to disclose that are closely linked with the statu
tory disclosure requirements. 2 1 ° For example, liability for securities
fraud is frequently predicated on an omission which is fraudulent be
cause of the defendant's statutory disclosure obligations or because of
duties imposed by state or common law. 2 1 1 The antifraud provisions
serve to effectuate and enforce these duties. 2 1 2
20 8 See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1 9 89)
(antifraud provisions have broader extraterritorial reach than filing requirements).
209 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 4 1 6,
cmt. a ( 1 987) ("The reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction depends not only on the territorial
links of a given activity with the United States, but also on the character of the activity to be regu
lated . . . . Thus, an interest in punishing fraudulent or manipulative conduct is entitled to greater
weight than are routine administrative requirements.").
2 1 0 Courts have found violations of Rule !Ob-5 and § 14(e) based on reckless misrepresentations
and, more significantly, on failures to disclose material information under circumstances in which
the defendant had a duty to disclose. How is this standard to be applied to a foreign transaction,
particularly where the U.S. imposes no affirmative duty of disclosure? For example, in SEC v. OSEC
Petroleum, S.A., [ 1 974- 1 975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 94,9 1 5 (D.D.C. 1 974), the
SEC took enforcement action against a West German company and its Luxembourgian subsidiary
for violations of § I O(b) and § 1 3 (d) based on the failure of the defendants to file a timely Schedule
! 3 D disclosing their purchase of more than 5% of the stock of a Canadian corporation through a
Canadian broker on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
Jurisdiction was premised upon the fact that the stock of the target company was also listed on
the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange and registered under § 1 2 of the Exchange Act. The SEC charged
that the defendants had failed to disclose their control intentions with respect to the target.
Although these allegations stated a cause of action for U.S. securities fraud, the defendants' actions
could hardly have been termed fraud in the absence of a statutory disclosure obligation.
2 1 1 An omission is fraudulent only if the defendant has a duty to speak. See, e.g. , Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 ( 1 9 80); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 28, 1 5 2
( 1 972). Courts have found a basis for such a duty i n the common law, state law, and statutory
disclosure provisions. See, e.g. , United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 5 5 1 , 568 (2d Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) (en
bane); In re Healthco Int'l, Inc. Securities Litig., 777 F. Supp. 109, 1 14 & n.5 (D. Mass. 1 99 1).
2 1 2 See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. I , 8-9 ( 1985) ("It is clear that Congress
relied primarily on disclosure to implement the purpose of the Williams Act."); see also Affiliated
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The application of the antifraud provisions to foreign defendants
thus raises the secondary question of whether the disclosure obligations
of a foreign defendant can be evaluated under the domestic standards.
At a minimum, the claim that the courts are not applying the more intru
sive disclosure requirements of U.S. law if they simply apply the statu
tory antifraud provisions is overstated. 2 1 3 I t is difficult and arguably
inappropriate to evaluate these provisions separately. 2 14 Nor is it clear
that the policy reasons behind applying domestic law broadly to remedy
a fraud in the purchase or sale of securities apply equally to litigation
intended to block or delay a foreign tender offer. Both the degree of
interference with foreign transactions and the costs imposed by applica
tion of U.S. law are substantially greater in a tender offer.
Finally, it seems appropriate, in making a choice-of-law determina
tion, to ask whether the strength of the U.S. interest depends on who is
challenging the transaction. An enforcement action by the SEC would
appear to evidence a stronger U.S. interest than a private civil suit, 2 1 5 and
the interests of the U.S. appear stronger in a private suit brought by U.S.
citizens than in one prosecuted by foreigners. 2 1 6 At least one commenta
tor has expressed skepticism at the vitality of the U.S. interests impli
cated by Gold Fields based on the fact that while the SEC examined the
proposed transaction, it did not institute its own challenge. 2 1 7
3.
Examining Conduct and Effects Tests Under Interest A nalysis.
At a minimum, interest analysis indicates that the territorial approach
currently employed is too simplistic because of its failure to recognize the
Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 1 5 1 (federal securities acts have as "fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard
of business ethics in the securities industry") (second emphasis added).
2 1 3 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 5 1 9 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.) ("It is elementary that the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to many transactions which are neither
within the registration requirements nor on organized American markets."), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1 0 1 8 ( 1 975).
2 1 4 Congress has not distinguished between these regulations for purposes of extraterritoriality.
Moreover, the transaction-oriented and continuous disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws are not designed as ends in themselves, but are aimed at preventing fraud and stabilizing the
markets by specifying the information relevant to an investment decision. Conversely, the antifraud
provisions operate as the enforcement arm of the acts' disclosure requirements. See supra note 2 1 2;
Securities Industry Association Letter, supra note 202 (explaining difficulty of applying U.S. an
tifraud provisions without also applying U.S. disclosure culture).
2 1 5 See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 33 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1 9 87) (suggesting that
a broad extraterritorial approach may be more easily justified in an SEC enforcement action because
the SEC, unlike a private litigant, would consider the foreign policy concerns of the State
Department).
2 1 6 See, e.g. , Russell J. Weintraub, A Proposed Choice-of-Law Standard for International Products
Liability Disputes, 1 6 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 225, 225-26 ( 1 990) (observing the propensity of foreign
plaintiffs to seek access to American courts, both because of more favorable substantive laws and
because of procedural benefits of the U.S. litigation system).
2 1 7 See Harold G. Maier, Book Review, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 676 ( 1 9 89).
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full impact on U.S. investors of applying U.S. law. The strength of U.S.
interests may vary considerably depending on the nature of the transac
tion, but U.S. interests clearly do not justify the automatic application of
U.S. law. In addition, there are problems even with the factors consid
ered by the courts. For example, in applying the effects test, the courts
have not explained which effects should be considered. Although many
foreign transactions and events-a fraud that causes the Tokyo stock ex
change to collapse, 2 1 8 a war in the Persian Gulf, 2 1 9 the merger of two
large Japanese automakers-have substantial effects in the United
States, 220 presumably the jurisdictional test requires something more to
justify a U.S. interest, unless the U.S. is to claim jurisdiction over all
foreign transactions large enough to have an impact here. 22 1
Alternatively, the effect of a foreign transaction on the United States
securities markets might be measured by whether the transaction in
volves securities that are traded in the United States. 222 It is reasonable
to conclude that, because the securities acts focus on regulation of the
domestic securities markets, it is those markets which Congress deemed
significant. This raises additional issues of line-drawing. For example,
the courts might, before exercising jurisdiction, question whether the for
eign issuer has purposely participated in the U.S. securities markets. It
might be reasonable to treat issuers who have sold stock into the United
States or registered their stock on U.S. exchanges differently from those
issuers who have refrained from deliberate use of U.S. capital markets.
2 1 8 See, e.g. , Diana B. Henriques, Global Investing-A Special R eport; In World Markets, Loose
Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1 99 1 , at D l (Japanese stock market scandal blamed for dip in New
York stock prices).
2 1 9 See, e.g. , Bill Barnhart & Stephen Franklin, Fear Factor Back in Markets, Prices OffAfter Iraq
Fires Back, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1 8, 1 99 1 , Business sect., at I (war historically brings fear and uncer
tainty to financial markets); Robert T. McCartney & Stan Hinden, Early War R eports Buoy Global
Markets; Stock Prices Expected to R ise in U.S. , WASH. PosT, Jan. 1 7, 1 99 1 , at E I (effect of Persian
Gulf War on U.S. stock prices); Sylvia Nasar, The Economy Lives, But Will It Ever Dance Again?,
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 199 1 , § 3, at 8 ("Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait caused the biggest one
month plunge in American consumer confidence that has appeared in the survey's history. ").
220 See Richard C. Breeden, Reconciling National and International Concerns in the Regulation
of Global Capital Markets, Address at London School of Economics (Nov. 8, 199 1 ), (on file with
author) (" 'BCCI' is as much a household word in the U.S. as it is in Britain, and financial scandals
or failur�s such as Drexel, BCCI, Salomon, Nomura and others have the direct potential for dis
rupting markets all over the world."). The increasing integration of the global securities markets
means that even transactions primarily affecting a foreign market generate an indirect effect in the
domestic markets and vice versa. See K.P. Fischer & A.P. Palasvirta, High Road to a Global Mar
ketplace: the International Transmission of Stock Market Fluctuations, 25 FIN. REV. 3 7 1 ( 1 990).
22 1 In Bersch, the court heard testimony from expert witness Morris Mendelson who cited a list of
domestic effects caused by the fraud in the foreign issue and the subsequent collapse of the issuer.
According to the expert's analysis, the fraud affected countless securities listed on American ex
changes, was detrimental to the interests of hundreds of American investors, and undermined confi
dence in the securities markets. 5 1 9 F.2d 974, 987-88 (2d Cir. 1 975).
222 See, e.g. , MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp. , 896 F.2d 1 70, 1 74 (5th Cir. 1 990) (finding
"effects" test inapplicable where issuer was not listed on any American exchange and had no Ameri
can investors).
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While imposing the requirements of the securities laws on a company
that takes advantage of the U.S. capital markets may be reasonable, cor
porations that have not chosen to avail themselves of the benefits of our
markets should not be subjected to their burdens. 22 3
The Bersch court explicitly rejected registration or listing in the
United States as a necessary condition to the application of U.S. law and
held that the antifraud provisions are applicable to transactions in securi
ties that are neither registered nor traded on organized U.S. markets. 224
Indeed, the counter to the purposeful availment argument is that if the
justification for regulation is the "effect " of the transaction on the United
States, regulation is justified whether or not the effect is purposeful. The
court in Gold Fields took this position in premising jurisdiction on
an effect that, while arguably not intentional, was "direct and
foreseeable. " 22 5
The Gold Fields decision also illustrates the problem with using the
percentage of U.S. holdings as a proxy for measuring the interest of the
United States. The court concluded that the presence of 2 . 5 % of Gold
Fields' shareholders in the United States was substantial for purposes of
jurisdiction. In part, this conclusion was based on the court's prior find
ing of jurisdiction in Bersch :
If in

Bersch

we could say that Congress intended American antifraud

laws to apply to a transaction involving

4 1 ,9 3 6

shares owned by 22 Ameri

can residents, then surely we must come to the same conclusion here, where
American residents representing 2 . 5 % of Gold Fields' shareholders owned
5 . 3 million shares with a market value of about $ 1 20 million . 22 6

Thus the court's analysis reduced consideration of the effects on the
United States to a simplistic numbers game. 22 7
22 3 This is similar to the test employed in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen, 444 U.S.
286 ( 1 9 80), as to when the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state litigant violates due
process. The Court in World- Wide Volkswagen rejected foreseeability as the limiting principle, ob
serving that automobiles (like securities) can readily be foreseen to travel to distant states. !d. at
296. Rather, the Court stated that fairness required that the defendant " 'purposefully avail [ J itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.' " !d. at 297 (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 ( 1 958)). The purposeful availment of a foreign issuer in employing U.S.
markets to raise capital is analogous to the deliberate use by a foreign manufacturer of out-of-state
markets for its goods. It was use of this character that the Court in World- Wide Volkswagen found a
sufficient predicate for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 297.
224 See also Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 5 1 5, 526 (8th Cir. 1 973) ( jurisdiction not
lost because "securities were foreign securities neither registered nor traded on an organized United
States market").
22 5 Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
492 u.s. 939 ( 1 989).
226 !d.
227 Does the United States have a greater interest in protecting U.S. investors when they consti
tute 20% of a corporation's shareholders than when they constitute 5%? Although the SEC bor
rows from this numbers game approach in formulating its tender offer exemption proposal, see supra
note 108 and accompanying text, it offers no better explanation of how the percentage of U.S. hold
ers relates to the legitimacy of applying U.S. law.
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Analysis of the size of U.S. holdings or the number of U.S. securi
tyholders represents a very narrow view of U.S. interests. In fact, the
numbers involved in some of the cases are quite small. How can the U.S.
have a valid interest in applying its law instead of U.K. law, for example,
if only 2 . 5 % of the securityholders are resident in the U. S. 228 and ninety
percent plus are resident in the U.K.? 229 The use of mere numbers also
ignores the method by which the U.S. investors acquired their holdings.
Corporations that market directly into the United States may j ustifiably
be burdened by the imposition of U.S. law; they have received the benefit
of the U.S. capital markets. But a bank may set itself up as an ADR
depository and issue ADRs, effecting secondary trading in foreign securi
ties, to U.S. investors without any request from or cooperation by the
issuer. Similarly, American purchasers may manufacture investment
structures that allow them to purchase securities in purely foreign offer
ings. 2 3 0 Should this unilateral action by a purchaser subject the issuer to
the application of the U.S. securities laws?
Nor is it clear that it is appropriate to apply U.S. law to all transac
tions involving securities listed or traded in the U.S. markets. The
Schoenbaum court suggested that a transaction involving stock listed on
a national securities exchange was a condition sufficient for the applica
tion of U.S. law. 2 3 1 The recognition of domestic listing as a determina
tive or even conclusive factor in the choice-of-law analysis ignores the
increasing interconnection of the global securities markets. 2 3 2 For exam2 28
229

On the other hand, the $ 1 20 million affected by the transaction is a lot of money.
See, e.g. , Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477, 501 (D. Del. 1 986)
("the Court must consider the fact that the interest of 98.4% of United Kingdom holders of Ples
sey's equity capital might hang in the balance [if the offer is delayed by a preliminary injunction
requiring General Electric to comply with the Williams Act]").
2 30 See, e.g. , MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 1 70, 175 (5th Cir. 1 990) (refusing to
apply federal securities laws to transaction in which plaintiffs used "extensive machinations" to par
ticipate in a foreign offering from which, as Americans, they should have been disqualified); see also
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 5 1 9 F.2d 974, 990- 9 1 (2d Cir.) (stating that the record is "murky"
as to how American plaintiffs came to subscribe in a foreign offering), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1 0 1 8
( 1 975).
2 3 1 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1 968) ("We hold that the district
court has subject matter jurisdiction over violations of the Securities Exchange Act although the
transactions which are alleged to violate the Act take place outside the United States, at least when
the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are detri
mental to the interests of American investors."). In Tamari v: Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 547
F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ill. 1 982), aff'd, 730 F.2d 1 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 8 7 1 ( 1 9 84), the
court went further. Although recognizing that no prior court had premised jurisdiction under the
effects test "solely on the basis that the securities involved were traded on American exchanges," the
court concluded that such trading had a sufficient impact on the American futures market to sustain
jurisdiction. Jd. at 3 1 3.
2 3 2 Many securities are traded in the United States through the NASDAQ system although they
are listed exclusively on foreign exchanges. Although a foreign tender offer would affect U.S. securi
tyholders regardless of whether the securities are actually listed on a domestic exchange, the applica
tion of the securities laws to all transactions involving securities traded in the United States has far
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ple, an increasing number of companies have their stock traded on the
exchanges of more than one country. 2 3 3 Should a plaintiff who is de
frauded in connection with a transaction on the London Stock Exchange
in the stock of a foreign issuer be able to sue under U.S. law234 merely
because that stock is also traded on the New York Stock Exchange? 235
The applications of the conduct test are equally troubling.
Although the Second Circuit has stated that the conduct test requires
substantial fraudulent activity in the United States at least when foreign
ers seek to recover here for their losses, other circuits have relaxed this
test. According to some courts, even a single meeting236 in the United
States between foreigners, in a transaction which is otherwise conducted
abroad and involves no offer or sale in the U.S. markets, may subject the
transaction to domestic law under the conduct test. 237 The rationale for
reaching implications. See CDC Life Sciences, Inc. v. Institut Merieux S.A., No. 88 Civ. 276 1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1 988).
233 It was estimated that in 1 98 5 shares of more than 500 major corporations were being traded
on at least one stock exchange outside their home country. See Rochelle G. Kauffman, Note, Se
crecy and Blocking Laws: A Growing Problem as the Internationalization of Securities Markets Con
tinues, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 809, 8 1 3 ( 1 985) (citing Daniel L. Thomas, Securities Regulators
Grapple with Extraterritoriality, LE GAL TIMES, Jan. 1 7, 1 983, at 20); see also Daniel L. Goelzer &
Anne Sullivan, Obtaining Evidence for the International Enforcement of The United States Securities
Laws, 1 6 BROOK. J. I NT'L L. 145 ( 1 990) ("Each of six major stock exchanges or trading systems
Amsterdam, the I nternational Stock Exchange in London, the NASDAQ system in the United
States, the Paris bourse, and the Singapore and Zurich exchanges-lists more than 200 foreign secur
ities."). For an example of a stock that is cross-listed on stock exchanges in London, New York, and
Tokyo, see the discussion of British Telecommunications PLC in Scott McMurray, et al., As Global
24-Hour Trading Nears, Regulators Warn of Market Abuses, WALL ST . J., Feb. I I , 1 985, § 2 at 25.
23 4 One might further ask whether the answer to this question depends (or should depend) on the
citizenship of the plaintiff. If the securities laws are designed to protect the U.S. markets and inves
tors in those markets, it is unclear why the protection should not extend to foreign investors.
235 A growing number of foreign securities are traded in the United States. According to the
SEC, approximately 425 foreign issuers have stock traded on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ and
approximately 1 100 issuers furnish information to the SEC pursuant to Rule 1 2g3-2(b). See Tender
Offer Release, supra note 2, at 8 1 ,743.
There are cases in which a corporation's stock is traded on a domestic exchange through the
issuance of unlisted trading privileges. Such privileges, which may be granted by the exchange for
the convenience of its customers, may result in the stock being traded on the exchange in the absence
of any application or request for listing by the issuer. The B.A.T. ADRs, for example, were traded
on the American Stock Exchange as a result of the Exchange's initiative to list them. See Pinto,
supra note 1, at 75 n.64; supra note 53.
236 See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 7 1 2 F.2d 42 1 , 425 (9th Cir. 1 983) (basing j urisdiction on
domestic conduct consisting of a single meeting in a Los Angeles hotel).
In both Psimenos and Tamari, the act of transmitting a customer's orders to the United States
for execution was held to constitute sufficient domestic conduct to support jurisdiction under the
Commodities Exchange Act. See Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1 1 03, 1 108 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 ( 1 9 84); Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1 04 1 , 1047 (2d Cir.
1 983).
237 Courts have concluded that a series of telephone calls and mailings between a foreign defend
ant and the United States constitutes sufficient conduct within the United States to justify applica
tion of U.S. law. See, e.g. , Continental Grain (Australia) Pty., Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 420 (8th Cir. 1 979); Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 5 1 5, 524-27 (8th Cir. 1 973).
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this approach-reluctance to condone activity conducted here to further
a fraud abroad-is unconvincing. 23 8 If there is no effect on this country
or its residents, the U.S. interest in employing its enforcement powers is
minimal. If the end result is indeed a fraudulent transaction committed
abroad, there is an alternative and more appropriate sovereign available
to sanction the conduct-the country in which the fraud was primarily
conducted. 239 Alternatively, if the transaction is conducted in a country
that does not view the deal as fraudulent, there is little force to the argu
ment that the U.S. is being used as a haven for fraud. 240
4.
Interests of Other Sovereigns.-In addition to considering the in
terests of the United States in applying its law to foreign tender offers,
the courts must, under an interest analysis approach, consider the inter
ests of other sovereigns in regulating the transaction. 24 1 The interests of
other sovereigns include the interests of the target company sharehold
ers. As indicated above, in a situation in which the maj ority of such
shareholders are not U.S. citizens, an application of U.S. law which inter
feres with the effectuation of a tender offer would appear to infringe on
those interests.
The burden of requiring courts to analyze foreign interests should
not be overlooked. It is difficult for the courts to analyze and weigh the
interests of the United States in applying its laws to an international se
curities transaction. 242 It is even more difficult for the courts to deter
mine the interests of the foreign sovereign and to balance those interests
against the interests of the United States as required. 243

238 See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 1 1 6 (3d Cir.) ( justifying jurisdiction based on court's reluc
tance "to conclude that Congress intended to allow the United States to become a 'Barbary Coast,'
as it were, harboring international securities 'pirates. ' "), cert. denied, 43 1 U.S. 938 ( 1 977).
23 9 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 209 n.5 (2d Cir. 1 968) (suggesting that this
might justify abstention on forum non conveniens grounds).
240 The Second Circuit has recently stated that, by virtue of its rulemaking authority under
§ 1 4(e), the SEC may regulate and even prohibit nonfraudulent conduct. United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 55 1 , 562-63 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane). See also James J. Junewicz, The Appropriate Limits of
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1 1 7 1 , 1 1 96- 1 20 1 ( 1 9 84) (dis
cussing breadth and variety of judicial concepts of fraud).
24 1 These sovereigns include the home country of the bidder, the home country of the target
corporation, and the country in which the majority of the target corporation's shareholders reside.
242 It is not clear that the procedure for balancing competing interests can be borrowed whole
scale from the domestic choice-of-law cases. See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a
Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. lNT'L L. 280,
289-9 1 ( 1982). Moreover the result of such balancing is apt to be "an understandable bias in favor of
the forum's policy, grounded in unsophisticated analysis, overt chauvinism, or erroneous perceptions
of a constitutional duty to advance legislative policies described in broad language but designed
primarily for use in a domestic context." Id. at 3 1 7.
243 See, e.g. , Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1 275,
1 283 (7th Cir. 1 990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (describing balancing test as "an approach that
calls on the district judge to throw a heap of factors on a table and then slice and dice to taste"); In
re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1 1 38, 1 148 (N.D. Ill. 1 979) ("Aside from the fact that the
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One factor courts must consider is whether the application of U.S.
law is unfair to the bidder or the target company. 244 Under the conduct
and effects tests, courts have not predictably and consistently applied
U.S. law. This imposes costs in terms of uncertainty-a foreign bidder
cannot ascertain in advance what conduct or effects will subject it to U.S.
jurisdiction-and fairness. 245
In the context of regulation of tender offers, predictability is particu
larly important. A tender offer is distinctive in that timing is often the
key to its success. In order for a takeover and subsequent merger to be
successful, the bidder must deal with risks of changing interest rates, ris
ing stock prices, and economic uncertainty. The possibility of tender of
fer litigation, particularly in a foreign country, adds a considerable
degree of uncertainty i:o the offer. 2 46 Moreover, any delay in a tender
offer, including the delay caused by litigation which ultimately is unsuc
cessful, increases the cost of financing the offer. 2 47 Because most offers
are made with short-term financing and refinanced after the merger, liti
gation alone may be sufficient to prevent the offer's success. 24 8
Although the factors considered by the courts under the conduct
judiciary has little expertise . . . to evaluate the economic and social policies of a foreign country, . . .
[i]t is simply impossible to judicially 'balance' these totally contradictory and mutually negating
actions."). Chief Justice Traynor described the impossibility of this type of judicial balancing as
follows: "Can you weigh a bushel of horsefeathers against next Tuesday?" See Brainerd Currie, The
Disinterested Third State, 28 J.L. & CONTEMP. P ROBS . 754 ( 1 963).
244 In the domestic context, application of a particular state law might violate the due process
rights of a litigant. It is unclear whether the federal Due Process Clause would protect a foreign
bidder from the unjust application of U.S. law. See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 10 (arguing for
due process limitations on extraterritorial application of U.S. law); see also supra note 1 75 and ac
companying text (due process may limit choice-of-law).
245 See, e.g. , Note, Predictability and Com ity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Juris
diction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1 3 10, 1 32 3 ( 1 985) (suggesting a fairness analysis must consider whether
the defendant's conduct "has amounted to a voluntary submission to United States jurisdiction").
246 See Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477, 497 (D. Del. 1986) (Gen
eral Electric would have much to lose in its fight for control of Plessey in becoming "entangled in
American law and regulations." On the other hand, "[i]t is at least possible that Plessey's efforts in
this litigation are motivated by a desire more to delay than to inform, more to gain an advantage
than to preserve neutrality.").
247 This remains as a significant deficiency under the SEC's proposed approach. See supra section
I II.A.2. Even if the bidder is relieved from the procedural and disclosure requirements of the Wil
liams Act, if the offer remains subject to the antifraud provision, it may be delayed or frustrated by
litigation under § 14(e).
24 8 This principle applies to any litigation challenging the offer. See, e.g. , Missouri Portland Ce
ment Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 8 5 1 , 854 (2d Cir.) ("Drawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it
would doubtless have remained sheathed in the face of a friendly offer, the target company typically
hopes to obtain a temporary injunction which may frustrate the acquisition . . . . "), cert. denied, 4 1 9
U.S. 8 8 3 ( 1 974); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Canso!. Indus., Inc., 4 1 4 F.2d 506, 5 10- 1 1 n.9
(3d Cir. 1969) (grant of preliminary injunction may cause bidder to abandon its takeover plans
instead of continuing costly litigation), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1 009 ( 1 970). In addition, litigation
may result in bad publicity for the bidder or draw the attention of third parties to the offer, such as
regulatory agencies whose examination increases the delay.
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and effects tests may not be unfair in the context of an ordinary purchase
or sale of securities, they raise concerns in the tender offer context. For
example, the courts have placed a great deal of emphasis on the degree of
U.S. ownership, direct or indirect, of the target company. 2 49 When the
target company is sued for securities fraud, the degree to which it is
owned by U.S. citizens may reflect the fact that it has benefitted from
using the American markets to raise capital. This is particularly true
when the allegations of fraud are made in connection with the sale of
stock by the target company.
The purposeful availment by a foreign target company of the U.S.
markets is less significant in litigation against a foreign bidder under the
Williams Act. The bidder has no control over and derives no benefit
from any American ownership in the target company. Instead, the target
company gains through its use of U.S. markets, as did Gold Fields, a
weapon against a foreign bidder. The availability of U.S. law as a defen
sive tool to block a foreign bidder runs directly counter to the congres
sional intent to "avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. " 2 50
The courts' analysis also fails to consider the interest another sover
eign may have in maintaining a different level of regulation. The j udicial
approach in the antifraud cases assumes, for example, that both the
United States and any foreign sovereign involved have a common interest
in providing a cause of action for allegations of fraud. This ignores the
fact that many other countries have not chosen to duplicate the U.S.
policy choice of favoring extensive regulation of its capital markets over a
system of caveat emptor. The U.S. capital markets are among the most
heavily regulated in the world. This is due not only to a congressional
perception that regulation is justified both in terms of investor protection
and stability of the economy, but also to a belief that increased disclosure
and vigorous enforcement of antifraud laws result in more efficient mar
kets, thereby reducing the cost of capital.
Although this system of regulation is a rational application of U.S.
249 This i s consistent with the courts' view o f the Williams Act a s concerned primarily with
investor protection. The dominant interest of the United States, in terms of interest analysis, would
be the interest in protecting its residents who are target company shareholders. See, e.g. , Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 5 8 ( 1 975) (Williams Act aimed at protecting public shareholders
confronted with a cash tender offer); Indiana Nat'! Corp. v. Rich, 7 1 2 F.2d 1 1 80, 1 1 8 3 (7th Cir.
1 983) (purpose of Williams Act was protection of shareholders through more information).
2 50 Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 58-59 (citing S. REP. No. 5 50, 90th Cong., 1 st Sess. 3 ( 1 9 67); H . R. REP.
No. 1 7 1 1 , 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 ( 1968), reprinted in 1 968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 520). Indeed, predicating
application of U.S. law upon the quantity of the issuer's stock owned by U.S. investors creates the
opportunity for foreign target companies to adopt a "defensive measure" against a hostile tender
offer by marketing stock to such investors. Cf Florida Commercial Banks v. Culverhouse, 772 F.2d
1 5 1 3 ( I I th Cir. 1 985) (balancing likelihood that shareholders will benefit by obtaining necessary
information against the likelihood of harm to shareholders by management seeking to thwart take
over attempt and likelihood that shareholders will be harmed by other aspects of remedy sought in
determining standing of target company under the Williams Act).
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perceptions and policy, it is not the only system possible. The notion
that extensive regulation reduces the cost of capital relies on the assump
tion that the capital markets are efficient2 5 1 and that the transaction costs
associated with the U.S. regulatory system do not outweigh the benefits
provided by the regulations. A foreign nation need not agree. Even
among countries that accept the premise of extensive regulation of securi
ties transactions, a variety of approaches to regulation are possible. 2 5 2
Thus the courts' conclusion that it is improper to allow the United
States to be used by foreign issuers as a haven for fraud disregards the
fact that determining the appropriate level of regulation of the securities
markets is a value choice by the issuer's home country. 2 53 Consideration
of the foreign state's interest in maintaining its own level of regulation,
even if different from the United States, 2 54 is an important aspect of inter
est analysis; in the international context it is part of what has been
termed comity. 2 55
Comity is a fundamental element of international choice-of-law. In
2 5 1 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H . Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549 ( 1 984). On the question of whether the stock markets function efficiently, see Lynn A.
Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: A n Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and
Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 6 1 3 ( 1 988).
2 5 2 Japanese regulation of tender offers, for example, requires any purchase of more than one
third of the total equity securities of an issuer to be made by means of a tender offer, even if the
purchase is made through a friendly, privately negotiated transaction. See Tomohisa Shinagawa &
Constance H. Jameson, The 1 990 SEL A mendments: Impact on M&A in Japan, 1 2 E. A SIAN EXEC
UTIVE REP., Dec. I S, 1 990, at 9. This approach is markedly different from U.S. policy. Conceivably
a failure to make a public tender offer in connection with such a purchase would be fraud under
Japanese law but not under U.S. law. Cf Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp. , 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1 985) (rapid private purchases for 2 5 % of SCM stock did not constitute a tender offer or violate
Williams Act).
2 53 This concern increases when the antifraud provisions are applied to the regulation of take
overs. Regulatory schemes and attitudes towards takeovers vary significantly among countries. The
lack of a uniform approach to takeovers was highlighted by recent attempts to reach accord on a
takeover directive for the European Economic Community. See (Institution) Proposal for a Thir
teenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Take-overs, and Other General Bids, 1 990
O.J. (C 240) 33; Nathalie Basaldua, Towards the Harmonization of EC-Member States' Regulations
on Takeover Bids: The Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 487 ( 1 989); see also Daniel M. Keirn, Note, The European Community 's Proposed Direc
tive on Takeover Bids and Its Impact on Shareholders' Rights, 1 6 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 5 6 1 ( 1 990)
(comparing takeover regulation in the United Kingdom and West Germany).
2 54 Cf Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 73 1 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir.
1 9 84) ("We are in no position to adjudicate the relative importance of antitrust regulation or
nonregulation to the United States and the United Kingdom."); Note, Developments in the Law
International Environmental Law, 104 HARV . L. REV. 1484, 1 6 1 2, 1 623 ( 1 99 1 ) (discussing tradeoff
between economic development and environmental regulation and explaining how this leads to di
vergent environmental policies).
2 5 5 Additionally, a foreign state's regulation of tender offers may not duplicate the "neutral"
approach of the Williams Act towards the struggle between bidder and target for control. For exam
ple, Great Britain limits the defensive tactics that a target may use under its City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers. The U.K. courts will not generally delay a takeover attempt on the basis of allegations
of improper conduct by the bidder. Accordingly, the courts of Great Britain are less accessible to a
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criticizing the application of domestic laws to international transactions,
many commentators raise the specter of comity without clearly setting
forth exactly what they mean by the term. The Supreme Court has de
fined international comity as "the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws. " 2 5 6 Thus comity is a voluntary basis for declining
to exercise jurisdiction; it is not a legal rule compelling abstention. 2 57
Like interest analysis, principles of comity require courts to assess
the competing interests of a foreign nation and the United States in the
application of their laws. 2 5 8 The principles of comity, however, contem
plate more than a mechanical balancing of the interests of two sover
eigns; they require courts voluntarily to defer to objectives of the foreign
state and to concerns of international law. 2 59 Comity requires the courts
to consider political factors, such as the extent to which application of
domestic law is offensive to other sovereigns, the extent to which other
countries may retaliate against the application of U.S. law, and the polit
ical effects this conflict may engender. 260
Objection by other sovereigns to the broad application of U.S. law is
not merely a theoretical possibility. As the United States has become
more aggressive in applying its laws to international transactions, other
target as a means of fighting the takeover. See Tony Shea, Regulation of Takeovers in the United
Kingdom, 1 6 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 89 ( 1 990).
2 5 6 Hilton v. Guyot, 1 5 9 U.S. 1 1 3 , 1 64 ( 1 895).
2 57 The concept of comity was first articulated by Joseph Story who explained that it was only
through the voluntary recognition by a sovereign of foreign law that the laws of a state could be
extended beyond that state's own territory. Story's theory of comity was developed in his Commen
taries on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1 834. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story 's Commentaries on
the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15 ( 1 9 34).
Story emphasized that the doctrine was not one of legal obligation:
[T]he administration of international law must rest [on] rules which arise from mutual
interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences which would result from a contrary
doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us
in return.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35 (4th ed. 1 852).

258
2 59

See supra notes 241-52 and accompanying text.
Compare Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 5 97 (9th Cir.
1 976) (comity involves balancing of interests of U.S. versus those of foreign states) with Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1 287 (3d Cir. 1 979) (comity is more appropriately consid
ered an abstention analysis).
260 See, e.g. , Kenneth M. Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19 INT'L L.
887, 895 ( 1 985); Lange & Born, supra note 4, at 42- 43. Trade controls, for example, are frequently
imposed in order to achieve political, rather than economic, objectives. See, e.g. , ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS § I (2d ed. 1983); see also Brief for Society
for Human Resources Management as Amicus Curiae at 1 8-2 1 , EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., I l l
S. Ct. 1 227 ( 1 99 1 ) (Nos. 89- 1 838, 89- 1 845), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs
(Microform, Inc.).
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countries have objected. 26 1 Furthermore, countries have retaliated
against aggressive application of U.S. law. This retaliation has taken the
form of statutes designed to reverse the effect of a given U.S. statute, 262
legislation designed to protect transactions in the home country or dis
criminate against U.S. business or business transactions, 26 3 and rules
aimed at preventing the intrusion of the U.S. litigation process.2 64 Simi
lar legislation is a possible response to U.S. attempts to regulate foreign
tender offers. For example, foreign sovereigns might pass laws forbid
ding U.S. investment in their businesses or eliminating requirements like
that in Gold Fields which require foreign nominees like ADR deposito
ries to forward information to beneficial owners. Thus the broad applica
tion of U.S. law might result in restrictions on U.S. investment abroad or
a decline in the availability of information regarding such investments.
Neither serves the interests of U.S. investors. 26 5
261 See, e.g. , Pengilley, supra note 4, at 835-36 (describing "furor" in international community
over expansive exercises of United States jurisdiction); cf EC Complains of Uncertainty Associated
With Exon-Fiorio, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 236 (BNA) (Feb. 2 1 , 1 992) (describing joint declaration by
the European Community and its member states objecting to the broad application of the Exon
Florio provision to interfere with foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies). In many areas, the expan
sive application of U.S. law is viewed as protectionist. See, e.g. , Peter PasseII, Tuna and Trade:
Whose Rules?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 9, 1 992, at D2 (application of environmental standards to interna
tional transactions offends political notions of free trade).
262 The most notorious of these is the British clawback statute, the Protection of Trading Inter
ests Act § 6 ( 1 990), reprinted in 959 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) F-2 (April 10, 1980). The
clawback statute allows a defendant who has paid a multiple damage award in a foreign judgment to
recover the multiple portion of that judgment from the plaintiff. See Joseph E. Neuhaus, Note,
Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under International Law, 8 1
COLUM. L . REv. 1097 ( 1 9 8 1 ) . Similar legislation has been introduced in Australia and Canada. Id.
at 1 098.
26 3 For example, in 1 980, Great Britain passed the Protection of Trading Interests Act which
authorizes the Minister of Foreign Trade to direct citizens to disobey the law of other nations when
that law is applied extraterritorially. Commentators claim that this legislation was passed in direct
response to aggressive extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes by American courts. See, e.g. ,
Matson, Note, supra note 7, at 1 66-67; Michaels, Note, supra note 1 46, at 929.
264 Legislation enacted by other jurisdictions to interfere with the application of U.S. law include
blocking statutes and secrecy statutes. Blocking statutes prohibit documents from being disclosed or
removed from the enacting state in connection with foreign litigation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442, reporter's note 4 ( 1 987). Such stat
utes have been enacted in nearly twenty nations, including France, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and West Germany. See Lange & Born, supra note 4, at 8-9. The texts of many such statutes are
reprinted in A. V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION-AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF
LEGAL MATERIALS ( 1 983).
Secrecy statutes forbid disclosure of information, usually by banks and other financial institu
tions, without customer consent. Violation of the statute may carry criminal penalties. See, e.g. ,
SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 1 1 1 (S.D.N.Y. 198 1). Many countries consider
secrecy statutes an important method of furthering a policy of financial privacy. See, e.g. , United
States v. Rubin, 836 F.2d 1096, 1 102 (8th Cir. 1 988).
26 5 In addition, the practice of using the laws and courts of the United States to interfere with
foreign takeovers may be imitated by foreign litigants. Such litigants might seek a broad application
of the laws of their home country in an attempt to interfere with a U.S. transaction. For example, in
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Many commentators have criticized the doctrine of comity by rec
ognizing that courts are ill-suited to apply it. 266 The evidence suggests
that the likelihood of a court choosing to defer to the foreign interests is
smalJ. 26 7 When there is a choice between applying U.S. law or declining
jurisdiction over a foreign transaction, courts are seldom inclined to ab
stain from hearing the case, particularly when they recognize that such
abstention is not mandatory, but discretionary.
In addition, reconciling the foreign sovereign's objectives and effect
ing compromises in terms of the application of each state's law is typi
cally a matter for the executive and legislative branches, not the
courts. 268 Although the foregoing analysis attempts to provide more re
alistic factors for the courts to consider in deciding whether to regulate
foreign tender offers, the difficulty of the task suggests that there is a real
risk that the courts will thwart the policy objectives of the other
branches 26 9 through their aggressive application of U.S. law. 270 This Ar
ticle therefore proposes a legislative approach to regulation of foreign
tender offers.
V.

AN

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO REGULATION O F FOREIGN
TENDER OFFERS

The concern of investor protection can be addressed without locking
investors out of foreign tender offers and without intrusive regulation
that may offend foreign sovereignty. The shortcomings of current SEC
the R. J. Reynolds takeover, bondholders in Switzerland sought to have the takeover enjoined based
on Swiss law of fiduciary duty. See Deirdre Fanning, Bonds that Bind, FORBES, May 1 , 1 989, at 48.
This "copycat" use of extraterritoriality could directly interfere with essentially domestic
transactions.
266 See, e.g. , MILTON HANDLER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATIONS 1 1 3 5
(2d ed. 1 983); Robert H. Bork, Introduction, 1 8 STAN. J . lNT'L L . 241 , 2 44 ( 1 982); Steven A. Kad
ish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act: Encouraging the Courts to Enter
the Political A rena, 4 Nw. J. lNT'L L. & Bus. 1 30, 165 ( 1 982).
267 See, e.g. , Note, The SEC's Waiver By Conduct Proposal: A Critical Appraisal, 7 1 VA. L. REV.
1 4 1 1 , 1 43 1 -32 ( 1 985) (discussing tendency of U.S. courts to undervalue foreign interests). The U.S.
judicial reaction to foreign bank secrecy statutes provided a clear demonstration of the courts' inabil
ity to recognize the different objectives of a foreign regulatory scheme. See id.
268 The shortcomings of the courts in resolving these conflicts are illustrated by the litigation
brought in foreign countries attempting to enjoin U.S. litigation on the grounds that the U.S. exer
cise of jurisdiction is unconscionable. See Note, A ntitrust Injunctions and International Comity, 7 1
VA. L. REV. 1039, 106 1 -64 ( 1 985) (discussing British Airways Bd. v . Laker Airways, [ 1 984] 3 All
E.R. 39). The British courts have unanimously declared their authority to issue such injunctions.
Id.
269 Traditionally, the political branches of government have played the primary role in foreign
affairs policy. See James W. Perkins, Note, In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation:
Sovereign Compulsion, Act of State and the Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Antitrust
Laws, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 7 2 1 , 729 ( 1 987) (suggesting extraterritoriality may implicate political
question doctrine).
270 For example, the United States routinely uses trade sanctions to further its foreign policies.
See Lange & Born, supra note 4, at 1 7-20.
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proposals and the inherent difficulty of requiring courts to analyze extra
territoriality on a case-by-case basis and to consider the relevant policy
factors, including comity, in their analysis, leads this Article to propose a
legislative solution. This Article recommends that Congress amend the
Exchange Act to address the application of the Williams Act to foreign
tender offers. 2 7 1
The Article proposes that Congress delineate the scope of the Wil
liams Act (and corresponding liability under section lO(b)) in connection
with a foreign tender offer as follows: U.S. law would apply to tender
offers made for the securities of corporations incorporated in the United
States and for securities listed on a national securities exchange or regis
tered with the SEC under Rule 1 2(g). 2 72 For all other tender offers
which are made in the United States or which affect U.S. investors, the
Williams Act provisions, including the antifraud provisions, 27 3 would not
apply so long as the bidder meets the following conditions: ( 1) the bidder
must provide U.S. investors with an English translation of any tender
offer disclosure documents required by the target company's home coun
try; and (2) the tender offer must be open to U.S. investors on substan27 1 Another alternative that would take cognizance of foreign and domestic policy concerns
would be to address the regulation of international tender offers through a diplomatic approach,
such as the negotiation of multilateral or bilateral mutual assistance treaties or memoranda of under
standing with other countries. Following the example of successful negotiations in such areas as
international discovery in insider trading cases (see, e.g. , Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, May 25, 1 973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 201 9; U.S.-Switz. Memorandum of Understanding on
Insider Trading, 1 4 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1 737 ( 1 982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. I ( 1 983)), the
executive branch could negotiate the degree of U.S. involvement that would justify application of
U.S. law and the degree to which that U.S. law would be applied. The SEC has traditionally been
skeptical of approaching the problems of global conflict through international negotiation, citing the
time-consuming nature and difficulty of such negotiations and the diversity of interests among the
different nations involved. See SEC Request for Comments Concerning a Concept to Improve the
Commission's Ability to Investigate and Prosecute Persons Who Purchase or Sell Securities in the
U.S. Markets from Other Countries, Exchange Act Release No. 2 1 , 1 86, at 20-2 1 (July 30, 1 984),
reprinted in 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1 305 (Aug. 3, 1 9 84). For examples of successful bilateral
negotiations in the antitrust area, see Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consulta
tion and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1 984,
U.S.-Can., reprinted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) � 50,464; Agreement Relating to Cooperation on
Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1 982, U.S.-Austl., reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. [ 1 969- 1 9 8 3 Current
Comment Transfer Binder] (CCH) � 50,440.
272 An alternative would be to apply U.S. law to national market system securities, as that term is
defined in SEC Rules 1 1 Aa2 - l and 1 1 Aa3- 1 -securities listed on a national exchange or for which
quotation information is reported on the NASDAQ system. Because of the wider dissemination of
information about national market system securities within the United States, investors in such se
curities are more likely to expect protection of the U.S. securities laws. Moreover, the actions taken
by an issuer to have its securities listed and thereby to encourage U.S. trading interest in those
securities may reasonably be characterized as a purposeful availment of the benefits of the U.S.
securities markets. See infra note 276. Incidentally, the ADRs in Ford-Jaguar were national market
system securities but were not registered under § 1 2. See Ford Release, supra note 64, at * I .
273 Congress might place some limits on the proposed safe harbor from the antifraud provisions.
For example, it might exclude insider trading from the safe harbor, in light of the increasingly uni
form international prohibition on insider trading. See ABA Letter, supra note 1 10, at 8.
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tially equal terms as foreign investors. 2 74
This proposal is designed to address the policy issues of extraterrito
rial application of the Williams Act directly. By adopting this proposal,
Congress would be taking the position that the protection of U.S. mar
kets must be balanced with a policy of noninterference with foreign mar
kets. This balance can be achieved by limiting the extensive regulation of
the Williams Act to situations in which the foreign issuer has chosen to
utilize the American capital markets directly. 2 75 With the benefit of this
use comes the burden of complying with U.S. law. 2 7 6
If the target's securities are not part of the U.S. markets, the effect of
the tender offer on those markets is indirect. Regulation of such an offer
has a greater effect on the markets of the home country, and the United
States should defer to the regulations of that country. 27 7 In such cases,
the primary objective behind U.S. involvement in the tender offer is pro
tection of its own citizens. 2 7 8 A recognition that complete protection
cannot be accomplished without substantial intrusion on the foreign sov
ereign, coupled with an understanding that the decision to invest over
seas involves a conscious trade-off between the protection of U . S . law and
the opportunity to participate in a broader global market, leads to the
conclusion that the most appropriate form of U.S. regulation would be to
require bidders to provide investors with all available information about
their investments, including disclosure documents in English. This re2 74 This requirement will not preclude the bidder from making a cash offer to U.S. investors and
an exchange offer abroad in order to avoid the registration requirements of federal law, so long as the
U.S. investors receive substantially equal consideration for their stock.
2 75 This approach is responsive to the strong congressional purpose of protecting the U.S. mar
kets and speculation in those markets through the federal securities laws. See, e.g. , H.R. REP. No.
1 3 83, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1 934) (describing effect of fluctuations in the stock exchanges on the
nation's economic system).
2 7 6 The nature of this approach is partly contractual. As a consequence of accepting the benefits
of the U.S. capital markets, the foreign corporation agrees to submit to the burdens of U.S. regula
tion of those markets. The implication that this approach accords with legitimate expectations of the
parties has played an important role in the analysis of personal jurisdiction, in which the courts have
concluded that it is not unfair to require one who has purposely availed himself of the benefits of
state law to litigate in that state. See, e.g. , World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 297
( 1 9 80); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 ( 1 95 8). As the Supreme Court has stated, if a defend
ant avails himself of the privilege of conducting business within a state, "it is presumptively not
unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well." Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 ( 1 985).
2 77 This deference is akin to the corporate law principle embodied in the internal affairs doctrine,
under which the law applied to a corporation's internal affairs is generally the local law of the state
of incorporation. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 48 1 U.S. 69, 90 ( 1 9 87) ("a corpora
tion-except in the rarest situations-is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single juris
diction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its incorporation"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) ( 1 97 1 ).
2 7 8 See, e.g. , United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 5 5 1 , 559 (2d Cir. 1 99 1 ) (en bane) (quoting
Lewis v. McGraw, 6 1 9 F.2d 1 92, 1 9 5 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 9 5 1 ( 1 980)) ("The
'very purpose of the [Williams] Act' . . . was 'informed decisionmaking by shareholders.' ").
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quirement is consistent with the general securities law policy of favoring
full disclosure over intrusive substantive regulation, a policy espousing
the view that disclosure alone is effective in combatting much of the risk
of fraud in the securities markets.
VI.

CoNcLUSION

The cursory analysis conducted by the courts under their current
"subject matter jurisdiction" approach to the extraterritorial application
of the federal securities laws focuses exclusively on judicial power and
does not address the significant policy implications of applying U.S. law
to foreign transactions. These policy implications include the effects of
applying U.S. law to a primarily foreign transaction on foreign interests
and on U.S. investors, effects that may actually prove detrimental to the
interests of the United States.
The difficulty of developing a workable approach stems from the
that
the decision to apply foreign or domestic law to an international
fact
transaction cannot be made through a court-administered balancing test,
regardless of which factors the court is directed to balance. Judicial in
competence in the field of measuring and setting U.S. policy, together
with the courts' inability fairly to analyze and weigh the interests of the
United States and a foreign sovereign compel a legislative solution.
The solution proposed in this Article is designed to address the legit
imate concern of investor exclusion, the objectives of the federal securi
ties laws, and the general political goal of noninterference with foreign
business transactions. By deferring to foreign law in transactions that are
primarily foreign in nature, the proposal reduces infringement on the in
terests of foreign nations. At the same time, the proposal balances the
interests of U.S. investors of full participation in beneficial financial op
portunities with the core interests of investor information and protection
under the Williams Act. The solution-equal participation together with
a minimum amount of mandated disclosure in English-is more respon
sive to the needs of Americans who choose to invest abroad while not
impeding the rights of their fellow foreign investors.
Although the proposal addresses a single area in the field of extra
territoriality, the principles upon which it is based can be used generally
to decide when U.S. law should be applied to foreign transactions. 279
Accordingly, this proposal may be viewed as a model for a legislative
determination of the appropriate limits of U.S. law.

279 See Maier, supra note 242, at 3 1 9 (the establishment of "clear value choices" and the consis
tent application of those choices "would contribute to the growth of transnational expectations
about legitimate limits on the exercise of power.").
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